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In 1985, the General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, 
Mikhail Gorbachev, launched a campaign known as “perestroika.” In 1991, the 
Soviet Union collapsed. The causes of and connections between these revo-
lutionary events continue to be debated from various perspectives. The disser-
tation contributes to this debate by drawing on intellectual history to examine the 
specific conceptual dynamics in reformist discourse in the Estonian SSR. It 
investigates the ways in which, alongside well-known concepts such as “glasnost” 
or “pluralism,” some other significant concepts spontaneously rose to prominence. 
They were institutionalized in law at the local level of the Soviet republics but 
eventually undermined the union’s existence. The dissertation focuses on one 
particular set of conceptual changes: uniquely in the Soviet Union, the Estonian 
SSR witnessed the transformation of the Soviet concept “self-accounting” (in 
Russian, khozraschet) to territorial “self-management” (in Estonian, isemajan-
damine, IM). This transformation facilitated radical changes in the political 
situation in the ESSR in 1987–1988, which further served as an inspiration for a 
cascade of changes in other Soviet republics. The dissertation proposes a new 
approach to conceptual history, highlighting the role of “small concepts” in facili-
tating policymaking, mobilizing different actors, and serving as catalysts for 
national self-determination.  
The aim of this introductory chapter is to lay out (1) the dissertation’s theoretical 
framework and (2) introduce the case and the historical context relevant for 
understanding the nature and dynamics of conceptual change during perestroika. 
It consists of three sections. In the theoretical section, I situate the specific approach 
I propose in global research on modern revolutions, particularly in current scholarly 
debates on the 1989 revolutions in Eastern Europe and the Soviet collapse. Drawing 
on the Cambridge School of intellectual history, I develop a new approach that 
focuses on what I call “conceptual innovation” in pre- and revolutionary situations. 
The second section provides an overview of the case of conceptual innovation in 
the Estonian SSR and the historical context relevant for understanding its specifics. 
I argue that this innovation was shaped by the following constraints and oppor-
tunities: (1) the economic experiments and expertization of politics in the 1980s, 
(2) censorship and the “locked-text problem,” (3) perestroika ideology in 1986–
1988, and (4) the rise of global technoscientific discourse in the 1970s and 1980s. 
The dissertation investigates these enabling conditions as resources for the inno-
vative acts undertaken in the semi-closed system. The third section (conclusion) 
summarizes the dissertation and shows how this approach advances existing 
scholarship, suggesting that it can serve as a foundation for a broader conceptual 






1. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
1.1. Structures, ideas, networks,  
and concepts in revolutions 
In the most general sense, our case is part of a set of revolutions that unfolded in 
1989 in Eastern Europe. Revolutionary processes lead to the radical restructuring 
of key spheres in society (political, economic, social, and ideological). They often 
lead to the overthrowing of particular political regimes themselves, often with the 
help of mass mobilization.1 In what follows, I will try to give an overview of the 
four main approaches to these processes in the current scholarship on perestroika: 
(1) structuralist and (2) ideational approaches, as well as (3) transnational 
(entangled) history and (4) the study of conceptual revolutions, highlighting the 
relevance of the latter two for my own approach (which I develop in the next 
section). 
In mainstream political science, we can broadly distinguish two kinds of 
approaches to the study of revolutions – structuralist and ideational.2 The struc-
turalist approach (represented by Moore, Skocpol, Tilly, etc.) stresses the impact 
of long-term structural factors as the leading causes of revolutions, such as socio-
economic, demographic, and institutional elements of pre-revolutionary situations, 
sometimes calling the outcomes “social revolutions.”3 For example, Theda Skocpol 
has influentially argued that “revolutions are not made, they come” – that it is 
“objective relations and conflicts” among groups and nations that explain revo-
lutions, not “the interests, outlooks, or ideologies.”4 The structuralist interpreta-
tions have presented the main causes of the Soviet collapse (1987–1991) in several 
ways, emphasizing the economic crisis (like the significant impact of the global 
                                                                          
1   This label (“revolution”) was assigned by contemporaries in 1989–1991. Aside from the 
“Russian Revolution” (which ended with the dissolution of the state in 1991), there were many 
other names that illustrated the specific character of the events: the “Singing Revolution” 
(Laulev revolutsioon) in the Estonian SSR, the “Velvet Revolution” (Sametová revoluce) in 
Czechoslovakia, the “Peaceful Revolution” (Friedliche Revolution) in the German Demo-
cratic Republic, and the “Negotiated Revolution” in Poland and Hungary. The years 1989–
1991 have been also described as a “revolutionary wave” in Eastern Europe, as a series of 
revolutions occurring in various locations within a similar period, often inspiring each other 
and thus becoming “affiliate revolutions” with similar aims. See Mark N. Katz (1999), 
Revolutions and Revolutionary Waves (Palgrave Macmillan).  
2  Leon Aron (2012), Roads to the Temple: Truth, Memory, Ideas, and Ideals in the Making 
of the Russian Revolution, 1987–1991 (Yale University Press), 16–19. Aron makes the same 
distinction (between structuralist and idea-centered approaches) in his 2006 article “Ideas of 
Revolution and Revolutionary Ideas,” Demokratizatsiya 14, no. 3.  
3  Theda Skocpol (1979), States and Social Revolutions (Cambridge University Press). 
According to Skocpol, “social revolutions are rapid, basic transformations of a society’s state 
and class structures; and they are accompanied and in part carried through by class-based 
revolts from below”: ibid., 9. 
4  Quoted in Aron (2012), 17. 
10 
oil crisis from the mid-1970s to the mid-1980s)5 or the “clogged arteries” of social 
mobility in the Soviet Union,6 but also citing other structural factors.7 We can also 
count the theory of “political opportunity structures” (POS) as part of structuralist 
theory. Used mostly in social movement studies, POS stresses that institutionalized 
politics create both opportunities and constraints for political actors (collective 
and individual alike), affecting their prospects to mobilize and influence politics 
and society. According to POS, the factors that determine whether actors succeed 
are (1) the relative openness or closedness of the institutionalized political system, 
(2) the state’s capacity and propensity for repression, and (3) the existence of 
conflicts among political elites, which can potentially lead to alliances between 
elite representatives and movement actors.8  
                                                                          
5  Egor Gaidar (2003), “The Inevitability of Collapse of the Soviet Economy,” in The Eco-
nomics of Transition, ed. Egor Gaidar (Cambridge: MIT Press), 30. For the same argument, 
see Vladimir Mau and Irina Starodubrovskaya (2004), Velikie revolutsii ot Kromvelya do 
Putina [Great Revolutions from Cromwell to Putin] (Moscow: Vagrius), 429. 
6  Jack A. Goldstone (2003), “Revolution in the USSR, 1989–1991,” in Revolutions, ed. 
Jack A. Goldstone, 261–271. 
7  The recent comprehensive overview of the mainstream theories that explain the collapse 
of the Soviet system and state is in an unpublished 2017 paper by Neil Robinson, “Explaining 
Soviet Collapse,” in the project Contemporary Russian Politics (DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2. 
29620.76167). Robinson separates the collapse of the Soviet system from the Soviet state. Our 
case is more related to the collapse (specifically, the dissolution) of the Soviet state.  
8  Doug McAdam (1996), “Conceptual Origins, Current Problems, Future Directions,” in Com-
parative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures and 
Cultural Framings, ed. D. McAdam, J. D. McCarthy, and M. N. Zald (Cambridge University 
Press), 23–40. From the late 1980s onwards, another approach has emerged in social movement 
studies in parallel to POS theory. It is the “framing theory,” which has been mostly related to 
the works of David Snow and Robert Benford. See, for example, D. A. Snow and R. D. Benford 
(1988), “Ideology, Frame Resonance, and Participant Mobilization,” International Social 
Movement Research 1: 197–217; and D. A. Snow and R. D. Benford (1992), “Master Frames 
and Cycles of Protest,” in Frontiers in Social Movement Theory, ed. A. Morris and C. M. Mueller 
(New Haven: Yale University Press). Since then, it has acted as a complementary theory to 
POS and has often been used in the same framework. It focuses on the actors’ strategies to 
“frame” the political agenda on the structural opportunities (but also to alter the perception of 
the opportunities). For using POS and framing theory in a combined way, theorizing the Soviet 
collapse, see, for example, Elena Zdravomyslova (1996), “Opportunities and Framing in the 
Transition to Democracy: The Case of Russia,” in Comparative Perspectives on Social 
Movements, ed. McAdam et al. For a closer analysis of the relation between the political 
opportunities, the concept of “master frame,” and “collective action frames” in the context of 
the 1989 revolutions in East-Central Europe, see, for example, John K. Glenn (2001), Framing 
Democracy: Civil Societies and Civic Movements in Eastern Europe (Stanford University 
Press); Anthony Oberschall (1996), “Opportunities and Framing in the Eastern European 
Revolts of 1989,” in Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements, ed. McAdam et al. I 
have applied the framing theory to explain the tactics of the Czech dissidents in the late 1970s. 
See Juhan Saharov (2021), “Combining Laclauian Discourse Analysis and Framing Theory: 
Václav Havel’s ‘Hegemonic Rhetoric’ and Charter 77,” Czech Journal of Political Studies, 
vol. 2 (forthcoming). On the Estonian SSR case, see Vello A. Pettai (2004), “Framing the Past 
as Future: The Power of Legal Restorationism in Estonia” (PhD diss., Columbia University). 
11 
The ideational (as idea-centric) approach, by contrast, emphasizes the primacy 
of ideas and ideals behind revolutionary actions. Leon Aron has criticized the 
structuralist approach for downplaying the role of ideas in initiating the revo-
lutionary processes, claiming that “objective” macro-structural factors (like eco-
nomic crises) cannot explain how the revolutions start.9 The proponents of the 
ideational approach claim that all revolutions have also been preceded by historical 
agents’ asking deep moral and existential questions that have subverted the legiti-
macy of the prevailing norms.10 Thus it is “ideas and actors,” rather than “struc-
tures,” that are the primary engines of revolutions.11 For instance, Aron has empha-
sized the central role of ideas and ideals in the Soviet collapse, focusing on the 
massive discussion on morality, freedom, human rights, and “truth” in Soviet 
society in 1987–1991 and people’s questioning of the very relationship between 
the state and the individual.12  
The first decades of the 21st century witnessed the rise of a new paradigm of 
global, transnational, and entangled history seeking to detect global convergences, 
transnational networks of non-state actors, and their impact on each other. This 
paradigm has also been applied to reconsidering the 1989 revolutions (both their 
causes and their aftermath). For instance, a couple of recent studies emphasize 
the “extraordinary convergence of marketization, democratization, self-determi-
nation, and Westernization” in the 1970s and 1980s,13 which paved the way for 
the collapse of state socialism and the global rise of neoliberal ideology and 
discourse.14 The transnational approach has contributed a great deal to showing 
the entanglement of the Eastern-Central Europe dissident movements.15 In 
                                                                          
9     Aron (2012), 16–19. For the ideational approach on the American Revolution, see Bernard 
Bailyn (1967), The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution (Harvard University 
Press). Especially in the 1990s, the structuralist transitology proliferated in mainstream 
political science and “continued to dominate accounts of the latest Russian revolution” in the 
2000s (Aron 2012, 335).  
10  I suggest that Vaclav Havel’s notion of “existential revolution” would fall into the same 
category, although Havel meant “revolution” in terms of one’s soul and ethics, rather than in a 
public manifestation. See Vaclav Havel (1991), Open Letters: Selected Writings 1965–1990 
(New York: Vintage).  
11  Eric Selbin (2003), “Agency and Culture in Revolutions,” in Revolutions: Theoretical, 
Comparative and Historical Studies, ed. Jack A. Goldstone (Belmont, CA: Thomson), 77. 
12  Leon Aron (2012). 
13  James Mark, Bogdan C. Iacob, Tobias Rupprecht, and Ljubica Spaskovska (2019), 1989: 
A Global History of Eastern Europe (Cambridge University Press), 20. However, the authors 
also stress that part of the communist elites in Eastern Europe were ready to reform their states’ 
economic systems to survive on the global market: ibid. On 1989 in a global perspective, see 
George Lawson (2004), Negotiated Revolutions: The Czech Republic, South Africa and Chile 
(London, Ashgate). 
14  Philipp Ther (2018), Europe since 1989: A History (Princeton University Press).  
15  For the transnational history of East European dissent, see Robert Brier (2013), “Entangled 
Protest: Dissent and the Transnational History of the 1970s and 1980s,” in Entangled Protest: 
Transnational Approaches to the History of Dissent in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, 
ed. Robert Brier (Fibre Verlag); and Kacper Sculecki (2019), Dissidents in Communist Central 
Europe. Human Rights and the Emergence of New Transnational Actors (Palgrave Macmillan).  
12 
studying the interactions between the Baltic and Czechoslovakian intellectuals in 
1988–1989, Luboš Švec has used the concept of “spillover” (a theoretical con-
struction proposed by historian Mark Kramer for studying the bidirectional inter-
action between the Soviet Union and East Central European states during 1989–
1991).16 However, he applied it not to states and their leaders but to non-state 
actors, showing the contacts between the Czechoslovakian opposition movement 
and the Baltic people’s fronts, and the “bidirectional spillover” between the Baltic 
revolution and Czechoslovakia in 1988–1989.17 Even so, Švec focuses mostly on 
dissident intellectuals in these movements, and not, for example, on the scientific 
circles or experts.  
The equivalent of studying the factor of “within-system reformers” (or “intra-
structural dissent,” as Alex Shtromas terms it)18 in state institutions has gained less 
attention in transnational history, although it is currently emerging. For instance, 
Robert D. English led the way in showing the transnational circulation of ideas 
between Eastern European and Soviet state scientific institutes and scholarly 
journals from the 1970s to the mid-1980s.19 In terms of the reform socialist thought, 
Trencsényi et al. have pointed out different “perestroikas” in Eastern Europe, as 
several drafts for economic reforms emerged in the region without the direct 
impact of the “Gorbachev factor.”20  
                                                                          
16  Mark Kramer (2003), “The Collapse of East European Communism and the Repercussions 
within the Soviet Union,” Journal of Cold War Studies 5, no. 4: 178–256. 
17  Luboš Švec (2018), “Spillover of Revolution: The Baltic Republics and Czechoslovakia 
1988–1989,” in The Baltic States and the End of the Cold War, ed. Kaarel Piirimäe and Olaf 
Mertelsmann (Peter Lang), 175–187. 
18  The concept was proposed by Alex Shtromas in 1981 as a reminder that, alongside “extra-
structural dissenters,” it is also important to consider the role of “intra-structural dissent.” 
Shtromas divided the latter into two sub-categories as (1) “egoistic intra-structural dissent,” 
by which he means individuals pursuing their individual or group economic interests (often 
by defrauding the state), and (2) “altruistic intra-structural dissent,” which “consists of pursuit 
of constructive (but in official terms controversial) political, social, economic or cultural 
goals.” The latter, as Shtromas observed in 1981, is “much less visible than negative, egoistic 
intrastructural dissent but is a much more functional vehicle of political change” (p. 75). See 
Alexander Shtromas (1981), Political Change and Social Development: The Case of the Soviet 
Union (Peter Lang), 67–87, quoted in Archie Brown (2007), Seven Years that Changed the 
World: Perestroika in Perspective (Oxford University Press), 164. Commenting on Shtromas’s 
distinction, Brown stresses that “by 1989 – following the development of freedom of speech 
and the advent of contested elections – the distinction between ‘intrastructural’ and ‘extra-
structural’ dissent had become obsolete” (Brown 2007, 165). However, since the dissertation 
deals mostly with 1986–1988 (Studies II and III) and even earlier periods (1979–1985 in 
Study I), Shtromas’s distinction seems applicable to those periods and illuminating for con-
temporaneous authors’ views on the options for “political change” in the Soviet Union in 1981. 
19  Robert D. English (2000), Russia and the Idea of the West: Gorbachev, Intellectuals and 
The End of the Cold War (Columbia University Press). 
20  Balázs Trencsényi, Michal Kopeček, Luka Lisjak Gabrijelčič, Maria Falina, Mónika Baár, 
and Maciej Janowski (2018), A History of Modern Political Thought in East Central Europe, 
vol. 2: Negotiating Modernity in the “Short Twentieth Century” and Beyond: 1968–2018 
(Oxford University Press), 28–41.  
13 
Of the three approaches, the transnational history is most relevant for the 
current dissertation. As we will see below, the dissertation contributes to that 
emerging field of studies by tracing the transnational contacts and interaction 
between state socialist experts and members of the ruling establishment.21 One of 
the dissertation’s studies explores the transnational network of experts (the relations 
between the Estonian and Hungarian top officials in the service sector, as shown 
in Study I), thereby examining the agentive capacity of the “within-system 
reformers” in the mid-1980s.  
One of the aims of this dissertation is to show also how the transnational devel-
opments in global science contributed to the political language on which we are 
focusing. While an increasing number of studies show the transnational conver-
gence of technoscientific expertise and expert language during the Cold War, they 
do not show how its vocabulary and concepts were explicitly used at the micro-
level in the 1989 revolutions.22 Study III in the dissertation shows this microlevel 
manipulation most explicitly, by analyzing how the global scientific discourse 
(e.g., application of management theory, scenario method, system analysis) was 
used by Estonian experts and scientists in 1987–1988 for the conceptual inno-
vation of isemajandamine.  
Alongside its numerous strengths, the transnational approach also shows some 
limitations. While we can evaluate the influence of transnational circulation of 
ideas and programs on the actors’ motivation and to the action itself (for instance, 
within the dissident movement around the Baltic Sea),23 there are also cases 
where this oppositional action originates in a specific historical context and is 
related to a particular set of enabling conditions, thus being unique compared to 
other processes in Europe. One of the examples of this phenomenon will be shown 
in Study II, where we see first how the concept of “economic self-management” 
in the Estonian SSR (and in the rest of the Soviet Union as khozraschet) was very 
different from seemingly similar concepts in Poland (samorząd) and Yugoslavia 
(samoupravljanje), and secondly, how this originality served as a resource for the 
Estonian authors. Similarly, to relate the development of khozraschet in the Soviet 
Union to the “obvious inspiration from the Yugoslav model of enterprise self-
                                                                          
21  For a recent study, see Bogdan C. Iacob, ed. (2018), “State Socialist Experts in Trans-
national Perspective: East European Circulation of Knowledge during the Cold War,” East 
Central Europe, Vol. 45, Thematic Issue 2–3. 
22  For the transnational history of the scientific community, especially the interlinked 
developments in Soviet and Western technoscience and system analysis, see Egle Rind-
zevičiūtė (2016), The Power of Systems: How Policy Sciences Opened Up the Cold War World 
(Cornell University Press). For “cybernetic language” (cyberspeak), which supplied Soviet 
social scientists and policy experts with new terminology from the 1950s to the 1970s, see 
Slava Gerovich (2002), From Newspeak to Cyberspeak: A History of Soviet Cybernetics (MIT 
Press). 
23  Lars Fredrik Stöcker (2018), Bridging the Baltic Sea: Networks of Resistance and 
Opposition during the Cold War Era (Lexington Books). 
14 
management”24 is debatable, as Soviet economic thought had its own conceptual 
reservoirs at hand. This case (and its impact on the Soviet collapse) shows why it 
is worth tracing the contextuality of microlevel concepts in terms of the 1989 
revolutions. Below I will explain the importance of concepts during periods of 
radical change. 
In the context of the theories of revolution, alongside the aforementioned 
(1) macro-structural or (2) ideational factors or (3) transnational aspects, it is also 
necessary to explore what can be called (4) “conceptual revolutions.” I do not use 
this term here in the traditional sense (i.e., “conceptual” like Copernican or 
Darwinian revolutions in the history of natural sciences)25 but in a more 
straightforwardly linguistic sense, emphasizing the role of “concepts” in politics. 
The Sovietologist Archie Brown was the first, in 1989, to describe the years of 
the mid-perestroika campaign (1987–1988) as a “conceptual revolution.”26 To 
quote Brown, “the conceptual revolution, like perestroika in general, was in many 
respects a revolution from above, stimulated by the new vocabulary of politics 
Gorbachev used.”27 Brown pointed out several concepts in Gorbachev speeches 
(explored in more detail in Chapter 2.3) that “helped to open space for the new 
political activity.”28 Brown also coined the term “Gorbachev factor,” which 
referred to Gorbachev’s personal influence on starting massive (and publicly 
visible) changes not only in the Soviet Union but also in other socialist states.29  
Thus, in parallel with the long-term socioeconomic structures and moral ideas, 
we should also investigate “concepts” as mediators and stimulators, which can 
become essential functions at specific moments, shaping and facilitating the 
actors’ intentions, understanding, and decision-making in politics. While the first 
three approaches all contribute to understanding the spectrum of different causes 
of modern revolutions, there is still a considerable research gap in understanding 
the dynamics of conceptual innovation to varying stages of political change. Like-
wise, we still lack sufficiently nuanced overviews of how it played out in different 
                                                                          
24  Besnik Pula (2018), Globalization Under and After Socialism: The Evolution of Trans-
national Capital in Central and Eastern Europe (Stanford University Press), 69. 
25  Paul Thagard (1993), Conceptual Revolutions (Princeton University Press). 
26  Brown (2007 [1989]), 264. 
27  Ibid., 264. Brown uses the term “conceptual revolution” concerning perestroika also in 
Archie Brown (2004), “Introduction,” in The Demise of Marxism-Leninism in Russia, ed. Archie 
Brown (Palgrave Macmillan). Gorbachev himself compared perestroika with “revolution,” by 
which he meant the continuation of the Leninist ideas in the October Revolution (in contrast 
to Stalin’s aberrations). In a public speech in Khabarovsk in July 31, 1986, Gorbachev declared 
that “I equate the terms ‘perestroika’ and ‘revolution’”: Pravda, August 2, 1986. In early 1988, 
Edgar Savisaar titled his book The Revolution Continues, which was also the title of an essay 
written by Gorbachev in 1987. See Edgar Savisaar (1988), Revolutsioon jätkub (Eesti Raamat); 
and Mikhail Gorbachev (1988 [1987]) “Oktjabr i perestroika: Revoljucija prodolzaetsja,” In 
Izbrannye reci i stati, vol. 5, 386–436 (Moscow: Politizdat). 
28  Brown (2007), 264. 
29  Archie Brown (1996), The Gorbachev Factor (Oxford University Press). 
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local contexts. Gaining such an overview would also involve examining the inter-
action between such local processes.30 
In the theories of revolution, there is a chain of analytical concepts like 
“relaxation,” “reform,” “repertoire,” and “revolutionary situation” that also need 
to be clarified in order to understand the focus of the dissertation. While the term 
“revolution” can be used (and was used in 1988–1989) by contemporaries,31 some 
political actors in the pre-revolutionary situation often try to reform and improve 
the system based on their interests. Many facets of the 1989 phenomenon that we 
are looking at can also be situated between reform and revolution. As a firsthand 
observer of the events of 1989, Timothy Garton Ash proposed to call them a 
“refolution,” a mixture of reform and revolution, varying from country to country.32 
While retrospectively, the term “revolution” has been commonly accepted to 
denote the whole process, there was a crucial (and later, somewhat neglected) stage 
in this process, as we can certainly point out the period of “relaxation” in 1986–
1987 in the Soviet Union before the much more turbulent period of 1988–1991. 
As mentioned above, the openness or closedness of the regime is one of the 
key dimensions in political opportunity structure (POS) theory, but it has been 
acknowledged long before that school. In 1856, Alexis de Tocqueville mentioned 
that “it is not always that things are going from bad to worse that revolutions 
break out. On the contrary, it oftener happens when a people… suddenly finds the 
government relaxing its pressures.”33  
Although many POS theorists and transitologists confirm Tocqueville’s obser-
vation, less has been said about specific “conceptual processes” of how these “mo-
ments of relaxation” during the end of “pre-revolutionary” periods become early 
revolutionary situations. Charles Tilly has defined the nature of “revolutionary 
situations” (based on Leon Trotsky’s conception of “dual power”) in history by 
referring to the main two characteristics as “the appearance of contenders, 
advancing exclusive competing claims to control the state, or some segment of 
it” and the “incapacity or unwillingness of rulers to suppress these contenders.”34 
While these conditions were indeed present in 1988 in the Soviet Union, I am more 
interested in looking at the more ambiguous start of this “situation” in which the 
                                                                          
30  I am aware of the danger of the teleological approach, i.e., attributing the importance to 
specific processes only because of their possible relation to the “final result,” which was 
gaining independence in 1991. Therefore, I try to reconstruct the debate based on the 1987–
1988 context, using contemporaneous sources. See more on the dissertation’s method in 
Chapter 1.2. 
31  The term “Singing Revolution” was coined by Heinz Valk (a painter and activist in the 
Estonian Popular Front) in a June 1988 newspaper article. It referred to the events of summer 
1988 in Estonia, which included mass gatherings and singings at the Tallinn Song Festival 
Grounds. See Heinz Valk (1988), “Laulev revolutsioon,” Sirp ja Vasar, June 17, 1988. 
32  Timothy Garton Ash (1993), The Magic Lantern: The Revolution of ’89 Witnessed in 
Warsaw, Budapest, Berlin and Prague (New York: Vintage Books), 14. 
33  Alexis de Tocqueville (1983), The Old Regime and the French Revolution, trans. Stuart 
Gilbert (New York: Anchor Books), 176. 
34  Charles Tilly (1995), European Revolutions, 1492–1992 (Blackwell), 10. 
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contenders emerge from the ruling elite. Which claims and arguments do these 
contenders use, and in which forms do they make it? Tilly’s concept of “contentious 
repertoires” brings us closer to this question.35 According to Tilly, “repertoires” 
refer to “claim-making routines that apply to the same claimant‐object pairs: bosses 
and workers, peasants and landlords, etc.” These can include, for instance, petition 
letters, pamphleteering, vigils, strikes, civil disobedience, and boycotts.36 There-
fore, repertoires function as an available structural menu for contenders (to choose 
their action form), but it also limits it, as according to Tilly, repertoire changes 
very rarely.  
However, Tilly’s approach on “repertoires” as a menu or program for con-
tentious actions was related more to the direct, physical form of action and not so 
much to intellectual conditions. For instance, although Tilly highlights “pamphle-
teering” in France in the 18th century before the French Revolution, it does not 
show us the actors’ manipulation (for example, with the prevailing neutral vocabu-
lary) in the pamphlets to pursue their political goals, or whether, and if so, how, 
some concepts were made oppositional. With the theoretical approach in this 
dissertation (which will be described in more detail in the next section), I view 
concepts, argumentative languages, and even scientific methods as potentially 
open to innovation and manipulation. Thus, I want to expand the concept of reper-
toire for the innovators in revolutionary situations by moving from direct physical 
forms of contention to more abstract ones, taking into account much more lin-
guistic aspects. Which kind of “concepts” and “languages” can be used in the mo-
ments when the regime’s pressure has been relaxed, but only a limited array of 
concepts is at hand? To answer this question, I argue, we have to move from a 
structuralist and ideational approach towards a theory that could investigate the 
dynamics of these specific processes in semi-closed pre-revolutionary situations. 
 
 
1.2. Conceptual and intellectual history.  
Method of the dissertation 
How could we best approach the linguistic aspects of the “conceptual innovation” 
in the Estonian SSR during the mid-perestroika era? It seems that the best-known 
approach to the study of concepts, “conceptual history” (Begriffsgeschichte), devel-
oped by Reinhart Koselleck, cannot help us here. First, the Koselleckian approach 
has been to study the “key concepts” in a long-term perspective, focusing on dis-
tinctively modern socioeconomic and political concepts (state, future, revolution, 
representation, crisis, etc.). In Koselleck’s words, Begriffsgeschichte tries to retrace 
the “dissolution of the old society of orders or estates, and the development of the 
modern world” by looking at how these twin processes have been “registered 
                                                                          
35  Tilly has elaborated this concept in Charles Tilly (1993), “Contentious Repertoires in Great 
Britain, 1758–1834,” Social Science History 17: 253–280; see also Charles Tilly (2010), 
Regimes and Repertoires (University of Chicago Press).  
36  Charles Tilly (2008), Contentious Performances (Cambridge University Press), 14. 
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through language.”37 It is a “long-term, profound, and at times convulsive trans-
formation of everyday experience” that reveals itself in the evolution of concepts.38 
Koselleck also talks about the periods of “turbulence,” where the contest for the 
concepts intensifies. One such period was the Sattelzeit (ca. 1750–1850), during 
which the development of political and social discourse led to the conceptual 
change of the main concepts. Second, the Koselleckian understanding of the 
“concept” itself seems unsuitable for analyzing the case under study. According 
to Koselleck, the “key concept” is an “inescapable, irreplaceable part of the political 
and social vocabulary [and] combines manifold experiences and expectations in 
such a way that they become indispensable to any formulation of the most urgent 
issues of a given time.”39  
While we can view the perestroika campaign as a modernizing project, the 
Koselleckian method does not bring us closer to understanding the microlevel 
dynamics of the conceptual change during the period. I argue that we should 
analyze the period (as Study II does) as an extraordinary moment for “temporary 
and replaceable” concepts. I stress that there are certain moments in history where 
the modern “key concepts” do not have discursive resonance. These are temporal 
moments of a “conceptual void” where politics is conducted by small, technical, 
and temporarily constructed concepts that move to the center of the public dis-
course and the center of the political language. The small concepts (which can 
also be borrowed from other domains) play a central role during these moments, 
and focusing on them enriches our understanding of revolutions in history. In 
short, I see these kinds of conceptual moments as a research object here.40 More-
over, understanding the context of these moments is crucial. We have to consider 
the manipulation and intentional ambiguity of the concepts in perestroika texts, 
                                                                          
37  Reinhart Koselleck (2011), “Introduction and Prefaces to the Geschichtliche Grund-
begriffe [Basic Concepts in History: A Historical Dictionary of Political and Social Language 
in Germany],” trans. Michaela Richter, Contributions to the History of Concepts 6, no. 1: 8. 
38  Ibid., 9. 
39  Reinhart Koselleck (1985), Futures Past: On the Semantics of Historical Times, trans. 
Keith Tribe (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press), 64. 
40  On the other hand, Koselleck’s understanding of concepts as a priori structures (stemming 
from Kantian tradition) that frame our thinking and without which communication and lan-
guage could not exist is still of great significance when we look at the interregnum periods of 
“conceptual voids” in history, which was also the case in 1987. The term “self-management,” 
which was manipulated by the ESSR’s opposition movement, was a constituent mediator that 
helped to build and make room for political communication, just like Koselleckian “concepts” 
do in the course of history. In line with post-structuralist thought, we could also conceptualize 
“territorial self-management” as a “vanishing mediator” – a concept elaborated by Jameson, 
Badiou, Žižek, and others. A more detailed theoretical analysis of that particular concept is 
beyond the scope of this dissertation. However, Kristian Petrov has applied it in Soviet studies 
to illustrate the temporal functionality of the concept “European home,” which Gorbachev 
used regularly in foreign relations during late perestroika (1989–1991) yet which vanished 
completely (just like “self-management” in the ESSR) in 1991. See Kristian Petrov (2013), 
“Russia in the European Home? Convergence, Cosmopolitanism and Cosmism in Late Soviet 
Europeanisation,” Europe-Asia Studies 65, no. 2: 341. 
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both by their creators (Gorbachev and his team) and by the opposition in Soviet 
republics. The paradoxical nature of the perestroika campaign, its simultaneous 
openness and closedness, allowed authors to manipulate using the “locked text” 
(examined more closely in Chapter 2.2), by choosing the flexible terms to extend 
their meanings in a particular direction. Therefore, the “usage of concepts” during 
this period needs meticulous contextual analysis. 
However, the “small concepts” approach, in contrast to Koselleckian’s “key 
concepts” elaborated in this dissertation, does not abandon the structure-agency 
axis. It is still a question of the conditions of agentive capacity for ideological 
innovation made within the “structures” during the early and mid-perestroika eras 
(1986–1988). We can differentiate between the available structural languages in 
this situation that can be innovated by the different “agents” through the same 
structures’ options. That is why I find it reasonable to apply here another scholarly 
tradition, called “intellectual history” and developed by the Cambridge School, 
whose focus has been on the contextuality of the texts in the history of political 
thought. This school has usually focused on the pre-modern and modern periods 
in the history of political thought. Still, the ambition here is to apply it and develop 
it further with the perestroika period.  
One of the leading lights of the Cambridge School, John G. A. Pocock, pro-
posed that when studying the history of political thought, especially the pre-modern 
period, “each political author has to be seen as inhabiting a universe of langues 
that give meaning to the paroles he performs in them.”41 Pocock used the term 
“language” as a set of “idioms, rhetorics, ways of talking about politics, distin-
guishable language games of which each may have its own vocabulary, rules, 
preconditions and implications, tone and style.”42 For instance, we can use legal, 
federal, republican or other languages to argue for some particular political goal. 
In 1966, Pocock wrote:  
 
Any stable and articulate society possesses concepts with which to discuss its political 
affairs and associates these to form groups or languages. There is no reason to suppose 
that a society will have only one such language; we may rather expect to find several 
[…] Some originate in the technical vocabulary of one of society's institutionalized 
modes of regulating public affairs […] Others originate in the vocabulary of some 
social process which has become relevant to politics.43 
 
What kind of tools should we use to investigate these “languages,” and how 
should we recognize them? In 1987, Pocock set down criteria by which historians 
could verify that a “language” was not their own fabrication: 
 
                                                                          
41  John G. A. Pocock (1985), Virtue, Commerce and History (Cambridge University Press), 5. 
42  John Pocock (2009 [1987]), “The Concept of a Language and the Metier d’Historien: Some 
Considerations on Practice,” in Political Thought and History: Essays on Theory and Method 
(Cambridge University Press), 89. 
43  John Pocock (1966), “The History of Political Thought,” Philosophy, Politics and Society 
(2nd series), 195–196. 
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a)  different authors carried out a variety of acts within it  
b)  they discussed one another’s use of it 
c)  the investigators can predict the implications, entailed by its use in particular 
circumstances (the experimental test) 
d)  they can discover its use in unexpected places (the serendipity test) 
e)  they successfully exclude languages from consideration on the grounds of 
non-availability (the anachronism test).44 
 
Here I would like to make some clarifications. Pocock used this concept by 
studying the history of political thought, seeing these languages as persisting over 
the centuries (e.g., civic humanism, or common law). I argue that we can also use 
this concept to study a much shorter time period and can also apply it to what I 
call “expert languages.” The vocabulary of these languages can initially be neutral 
or apolitical. Still, they always have the potential to be used directly in the 
political field (for example, in direct argumentation in parliament) or, for instance, 
in the public press.45 For example, I see the argumentation forms in cybernetics, 
system analysis, or future studies as part of the possible argumentative “lan-
guages” for different agents (see Table 1 in Chapter 2.6).  
However, Pocock was more interested in studying “languages in which utter-
ances were performed, rather than the utterances which were performed in them… 
hoping to find language as context, not text.”46 This dissertation looks at both 
topics, but especially the latter – how are languages used in utterances so as to 
achieve innovation (and promote reforms)? My main theoretical inspiration for 
this task has been the work of another leading scholar of the Cambridge School: 
Quentin Skinner. Skinner is known for suggesting that we can trace the history 
of concepts only through “their uses in the argument.” Therefore, we ought to study 
what the authors were actually “doing” within an intellectual debate.47 Both authors 
were also contributors to the “linguistic turn” in intellectual history in the 1960s.48 
While Pocock’s approach seeks to reconstruct the more abstract “languages” of 
these debates, Skinner’s approach consists of studying specific utterances as 
                                                                          
44  Pocock (1987), 94. The list is a shortened version, quoted from Iain Hampsher-Monk (1998), 
“Speech Acts, Languages or Conceptual History,” in History of Concepts: Comparative Per-
spectives, ed. Iain Hampsher-Monk, Karin Tilmans, and Frank van Vree (Amsterdam Uni-
versity Press), 41. 
45  I suggest that this more narrow concept (as an elaboration from Pocockian “language”) 
can also be applied on the “language of anti-politics” in East Central Europe in the 1970s and 
1980s, where it became actually political in the sense that it (in)directly questioned the political 
regime’s morality and legitimacy. 
46  Pocock (1987), 89. 
47  Quentin Skinner (2002), Visions of Politics I: Regarding Method (Cambridge University 
Press), 86. 
48  For the “linguistic turn” and the Cambridge School in intellectual history, see Eva Piirimäe 
(2008), “Keeleline pööre,” Keel ja Kirjandus, nos. 8–9, 589−603. 
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distinctive kinds of conceptual “moves” made within these languages.49 As Skinner 
writes, “to understand any serious utterance [as a move], we need to grasp not 
merely the meaning of what was said but at the same time the intended force with 
which the utterance is issued.”50 Below I will note three steps from the Skinnerian 
method, which I suggest should also be followed in exploring our case. 
First, how should we proceed to understand the “intended force” of an utter-
ance? In his influential early essay “Meaning and Understanding in the History 
of Ideas” (1969), Skinner proposed two methodological steps for studying the 
history of political thought. To understand the intentions of the authors (who are 
writing “at the time when they wrote for the specific audience they had in mind”), 
first, we have to begin by “trying to delineate the full range of communications that 
could have been conventionally performed on the given occasion by the issuing 
of the given utterance.” Secondly, we must “trace the relations between the given 
utterance and this wider linguistic context as a means of decoding the intentions 
of the given writer.”51  
The second theoretical assumption that I follow here is Skinner’s assertion that 
we should pay attention to “available normative languages.” These are the existing 
moral vocabularies that guide each author conceptually because “the problem 
facing an agent… must in part be the problem of tailoring his projects to fit the 
available normative language.”52 Like Tilly, Skinner emphasizes the conventional 
constraints for the innovator and illustrates it with the saying that “every revo-
lutionary is to this extent obliged to march backward into battle.”53 Our aim should 
be to discover the actions of those authors who were contributing to particular dis-
courses; thereby, we should “recognize the ways in which they followed or chal-
lenged or subverted the conventional terms of those discourses themselves.”54 We 
should see these discourses as conventional resources for the inventions, and we 
should “analyze a multitude of contemporaneous sources” in order to retrace the 
meaning that the author might have wanted to give to a text within that very 
specific context. 
                                                                          
49  Whereas Peter Laslett (another member of the Cambridge School) implemented “temporal” 
contexts, Pocock highlighted “linguistic” contexts, “each existing side by side and perhaps 
interacting with others, while remaining distinct and having a history of its own.” Eventually, 
Pocock preferred the history of political “discourse” to that of political “thought,” wishing to 
widen and refine the field into the study of “speech, literature, and public utterance in general, 
involving an element of theory and carried on in a variety of contexts with which it can be 
connected in a variety of ways.” Pocock (1988), “What Is Intellectual History?” in What Is 
History Today? (London: MacMillan Press), 114. 
50  Skinner (2002), 82. 
51  Ibid., 87. 
52  Quentin Skinner (1978), Foundations of Modern Political Thought (Cambridge University 
Press), 12. 
53  Quentin Skinner (1988), “Some Problems in the Analysis of Political Thought and Action,” 
in Meaning and Context: Quentin Skinner and his Critics, ed. James Tully (Princeton Uni-
versity Press), 112. 
54  Skinner (2002), 125. 
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Thirdly, Skinner has written on the conceptual innovation we are focusing on 
here, although from a slightly different perspective. In his 1969 article, Skinner 
emphasized that to understand the authors’ intentions, we have to bear in mind 
that “they may deliberately employ a range of oblique rhetorical strategies” (e.g., 
irony).55 In other words, we should understand the seemingly conventional content 
of public letters, proposals, or pamphlets as a possible rhetorical strategy to per-
form speech acts for goals that, at the same time, might challenge conventional 
norms. In a much later work, “Moral Principles and Social Change” (2002), 
Skinner focused specifically on rhetorical strategies of “innovating ideologists,” 
a term he borrows from Max Weber. He buttressed his argument with the cases 
of how some authors changed the conventional “evaluative-descriptive terms” 
(and sometimes adjectives as well) in the “moral language” in 17th-century 
England.56 For that linguistic action, Skinner distinguished several strategies that 
are relevant to our case. First, he asserts that “it is possible to perform certain acts 
simply in speaking or writing in a certain way.”57 He distinguishes five different 
strategies related to that assertion: (1) to coin new terms (which Skinner finds a 
rare one); (2) to transform a neutral into a favorable term (usually by metaphorical 
extension) and applying it in virtue of its extended meaning to describe the course 
of action you wish to see commended; (3) to apply a term normally used to 
express disapproval in such a way as to neutralize it; (4) to reverse the speech act 
potential of an existing unfavorable turn; or (5) to manipulate the criteria for 
applying a current set of commendatory terms.58  
I propose that with the conceptual innovation of “self-management” in 1987, 
we are dealing with the second type of rhetorical strategy in Skinner’s list; Skinner 
himself found the fifth one to be the least studied yet “the most widespread and 
important forms of ideological argument.”59 Although Skinner examines this lan-
guage in relation to morality and economic behavior (coining or changing terms 
like “frugality,” “discerning,” “shrewdness,” “spendthrift,” “obsequious,” and 
“providence” in 17th-century England), his approach is also applicable in other 
contexts and to different time periods.60 The general principle here (irrespective 
of the historical period) is that these strategies are based on an existing vocabulary 
in society (which is available to use without fearing persecution, which is very 
important to our case) and that there are authors’ intentional linguistic actions for 
transforming “a neutral into a favourable term” and then applying its “extended 
meaning” in the way they wish to see commended. 
                                                                          
55  Ibid., 80. 
56  Ibid., 145–157. 
57  Ibid., 149. 
58  Ibid., 151–152. 
59  Ibid., 153. 
60  For example, as Skinner shows, the term “providence,” which initially had only a religious 
meaning in England (as “God’s providence”) was stretched by several authors during the first 
half of the 17th century in such a way that the term began to be “applied to refer simply to 
acting with foresight about practical affairs.” See Skinner (2002), 153. 
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Thus, my aim in the dissertation is to apply the Skinnerian method to explore 
contemporary history.61 How can this contribute to the existing research in the 
field? In studying conceptual innovation in late totalitarian regimes (a concept 
that will be explained in Chapter 2.2), I find Skinner’s insights relevant for three 
reasons. First, the constraints on self-expression are higher than usual in these 
regimes. Because of the “locked-text” phenomenon (again, analyzed in more detail 
in Chapter 2.2), authors are forced to continually assess what the censor might do 
and thus apply self-censorship. That intensifies the search for contemporaneous 
sources to make the change. Second, the interpretation and manipulation of con-
cepts in the closed discourse becomes extremely diverse, providing opportunities 
for conceptual innovation. And third, the concepts were used in various ways, not 
only in the Russian language but also in various native languages in other Soviet 
republics, where the “rhetorical manipulation” of the translational aspect comes 
into play. 
As a whole, the approach introduced here seeks to combine Pocock and Skinner 
in a single framework. It views “structures” as available intellectual resources (for 
the authors) and the “agency” of the authors as a capacity to make conceptual 
innovations using these resources. It focuses on the revolution’s specific situation – 
the first emergence of the alternative political proposals within the censored and 
highly ideological public sphere. It is the situation in which the radical ideas enter 
the semi-public sphere, using previously accepted languages for that purpose. The 
question is, how have the conceptual innovations within these languages emerged 
and resonated in the semi-public sphere and made their way into the highest po-
litical arena? At the same time, the dissertation aims to expand the aforementioned 
scope of the traditional Cambridge School from studying exclusively the history 
of political thought to more practical politics – policy papers, reports, project pro-
posals, and so on. It also wishes to extend the scope from philosophers to every-
day political agents – top officials, experts, scientists, party intelligentsia, and so 
on, who were authors of the ideas and writings in the public sphere and the pro-
posals in the closed offices in state apparatuses. I suggest that this modified 
approach enables us to shift our attention to the possibilities of conceptual inno-
vations in these ambiguous situations where the distinct political battles are not 
shaped yet, on the interaction between the available “languages” and innovative 
                                                                          
61  The application of the Skinnerian method on contemporary history, particularly on lin-
guistic expressions during the Cold War period, is rare. A notable exception is Robert Brier, 
who has directly used the Skinnerian method to study East European dissident political thought 
and has pointed out the strategic use of the adjective “totalitarian” in the essays of Polish 
dissident Adam Michnik in the mid-1970s. According to Brier, Michnik intentionally used the 
term and concept “totalitarian” to highlight the communist regime’s dangerousness, particu-
larly to a Western audience, namely to French and West German left-wing politicians. With 
the help of this strategy, it initiated the comeback of the forgotten discourse of “totali-
tarianism” to the European and US intellectual and political elite in the late 1970s and 1980s. 
See Robert Brier (2011), “Adam Michnik’s Understanding of Totalitarianism and the West 
European Left: A Historical and Transnational Approach to Dissident Political Thought,” East 
European Politics and Societies 25. 
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policy proposals made within them, as well as on the short-term contextuality 
between the proposals themselves.62  
In what follows, I will describe more specifically my sources related to the 
research. I analyze the authors’ innovative use of contemporaneous propaganda 
practices (the quotations of Leninist classic works),63 the discourse of market 
socialism (local economic experiments in the ESSR, reform models from other 
socialist states, the NEP), and the prevailing global scientific thought in the ESSR 
(cybernetics, system theory, management, future studies), as well as the con-
temporaneous scientific methods (like the usage of the scenario method in 1986–
1987). I do not consider them causes of the revolution but “resources” for the con-
ceptual innovation and its legitimation. I aim to delve deep into these resources, 
which were all available to Estonian authors.  
The studies are based mostly on public essays, articles, and proposals from 
1986–1988 (Studies II and III) and archive materials (especially Study I). The 
archive materials used for the dissertation are the archive of the ESSR’s Ministry 
of Services and Juhan Sillaste’s personal archive, both in the Estonian National 
Archive (Eesti Rahvusarhiiv, ERA), as well as the protocols of meetings of the 
Tartu Group of Self-Management (Isemajandamise Tartu Grupp) and the Cul-
tural Council of the Creative Unions of the Estonian SSR (Eesti NSV Loomin-
guliste Liitude Kultuurinõukogu) in the ERA. I have also used the protocols of 
expert group meetings in the ESSR’s Planning Committee from August 1987 
(from Ivar Raig’s private collection). I conducted several semi-structured inter-
views in 2015–2020 with individuals who initiated the economic experiments 
before the perestroika period (Juhan Sillaste) or proposed the experiment drafts 
(Ivar Raig); with the leader of the Tartu Group of Self-Management (Marju 
Lauristin), and with economists and management scholars in the IME Council 
(IME Probleemkomitee) (such as Ivi Proos and Erik Terk). For the dissertation, I 
have also interviewed several other contemporaneous authors who wrote in the 
public press (Rein Ruutsoo, Peeter Vihalemm) and Rein Veidemann, who served 
as an editor of the pro-perestroika journal Vikerkaar in 1986–1989. Although the 
interviews are not my primary source material, they have provided highly valu-
able heuristic clues for understanding the authors’ tactical and linguistic choices 
during these periods, for instance, for proposing economic experiments in 1983, 
for publishing in Vikerkaar in 1986, or for balancing the ideological content in 
the Four-Man proposal in 1987. 
The dissertation focuses on the reformist discourse. Thus, the dissertation does 
not study or discuss dissident or Estonian radical-nationalist thought in that 
                                                                          
62  For example, the relationship between the Estonian Planning Committee’s nationwide 
contest of future scenarios in May 1987 and the Four-Man Proposal in September 1987, which 
is analyzed in Study III. 
63  For example, in 1986, the pro-perestroika magazine Aja Pulss in the ESSR had a monthly 
section for “Lenin’s principles” as a practical manual for authors to use in public propaganda 
work. Perestroika as a campaign was also a “continuation of the revolution,” based on Lenin’s 
ideas. 
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period, for example, the shaping of the political agenda of the Estonian National 
Independence Party (established in July 1988) or the rhetoric of the legal resto-
rationist movement (Kodanike komiteed) in 1989–1990. The reason for limiting 
the dissertation’s scope in this way is, first, the scarcity of studies on Estonian 
reformist thought, as considerably more scholarly attention has been paid to the 
dissident and legal restorationist thought.64 The other reason is that the legal resto-
rationist thought emerged in the public sphere under the conditions of the uncen-
sored press (1989–1990). Over the course of this period, previously radical ideas 
such as the legal continuity of the pre-war Estonian Republic were adopted (to 
various degrees) by all political forces, including the Estonian Popular Front. The 
focus of the dissertation is on the ideas and concepts that preceded this more 
liberal late-perestroika period in the ESSR and were part of the semi-closed but 
reformist mid-perestroika discourse. Another topic outside the dissertation’s 
scope is analysis of the impact of the “phosphorite campaign” on the conceptual 
processes in 1987.65 Again, significant research has been done previously on this 
topic, starting with Marju Lauristin’s classic study from 1988 on the effect of the 
“phosphorite syndrome” on the publicity during 1987–1988.66 The other reason 
for excluding the “phosphorite campaign” from this study is the broader temporal 
frame of the study, as the dissertation’s aim is to map out more long-term intel-
lectual resources for the conceptual innovation in 1987. 
There are only a few studies which have applied intellectual history to the mid-
perestroika period. Timur Atnashev is one of the few authors who has directly 
deployed the methods of the Cambridge School in studying the argumentative 
languages of the perestroika period, focusing on authors’ agentive capacities in 
                                                                          
64  On the Estonian dissident movement in the transnational context, see Lars Fredrik Stöcker 
(2018). On legal restorationist thought, see Vello Andres Pettai’s PhD dissertation on the 
Citizen Committees (Kodanike komiteed) movement in 1989–1990, which can be considered 
a case study on one argumentative language that framed the quest for independence through 
the legal continuity of the prewar Estonian Republic. Vello A. Pettai (2004), “Framing the Past 
as Future: The Power of Legal Restorationism in Estonia” (PhD diss., Columbia University). 
65  The “phosphorite campaign” (also called the “phosphorite war”) refers to the situation in 
the ESSR in spring and summer 1987, when local activists launched an environmental cam-
paign against Moscow’s plan to build phosphorite mines in northeast Estonia. Besides the 
potential “ecological crisis” that this plan posed to the ESSR, it was quickly related to the “demo-
graphic concern” over the increasing flow of migrants from other Soviet republics, which would 
have increased with the mining activities. This concern had emerged as an important issue 
among locals in the early 1980s. These two aspects (ecological and demographic concerns), as 
existential threats to the republic and to the nation, were arguably the additional triggers that 
led local scientists to push for territorial self-management, which could protect the republic 
legally from this kind of central planning. On the fears within the local population, see Olev 
Liivik (2018), “Glasnost Policy Reaching Estonia: Fear and Hope in the Protest Letters of 
Estonian Residents during the Campaign against the Phosphorite Mines in 1987,” in The Baltic 
States and the End of the Cold War, ed. Kaarel Piirimäe and Olaf Mertelsmann (Peter Lang), 
123–151. 
66  Marju Lauristin (1988) Fosforiidisündroom ja avalikkuse areng. Eesti Loodus, nos. 7–8.  
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the Soviet Union’s central press.67 By analyzing the changes in the usages of 
specific idioms, Atnashev showed that the pluralism, democratic values, and open-
ness concerning state’s reforms in authors’ texts went through both a liberal 
period (1986–1988) and a much more conservative period (1989–1991).68 The 
research in conceptual history on the perestroika period has been scarce as well. 
However, there have been some studies that analyze the concepts of “state,” 
“perestroika,” and “glasnost.”69 Only some Estonian works have scrutinized the 
adoption of the ESSR’s sovereignty declaration (addressed in Chapter 2.1.). For 
instance, Hent Kalmo has shown how the constitutional resource of the concept 
“sovereignty” allowed its implementation on the union republican level in 1988.70 
From the perspective of entangled history, a valuable contribution for under-
standing the transnational aspect has been Lars Fredrik Stöcker’s work on relations 
between the Estonian political elite, economic experts, and their Nordic partners 
to gain Swedish and Finnish know-how for the economic reforms in the ESSR in 
                                                                          
67  Timur Atnashev (2010), “Transformation of the Political Speech under Perestroika: Rise 
and Fall of Free Agency in the Changing Idioms, Rules and Second-Order Statements of the 
Emerging Intellectual Debates (1985–1991)” (PhD diss., European University Institute, 
Florence). 
68  Comparing the radicalism of the ESSR press and Soviet central press, the difference in the 
liberal periods is remarkable; it is almost as if they traded places. Whereas the Soviet press in 
1986–1987 was liberal, even radical, in its promotion of perestroika ideas (which in turn 
inspired Estonian authors in 1987), in 1989–1990 the Soviet press turned more conservative 
and nationalist: see Atnashev (2010). At the same time, the ideas of Estonian perestroika in 
the local ESSR press started slowly and carefully in 1985–1986 but opened up step by step to 
more radical ideas until, by mid-1989, it was no longer restricted by censorship. 
69  For the concept of “state” in the Lithuanian SSR, see Justinas Dementavičius (2011), 
“Lithuanian Political Thought in the Twentieth Century and its Reflections in Sąjūdis: What 
Kind of State Have Lithuanians Been Fighting For?” Contributions to the History of Concepts 
6, no. 1: 89–110. For discussion of the concept of perestroika, see Kristian Petrov (2008), 
“Construction, Reconstruction, Deconstruction: The Fall of the Soviet Union from the Point 
of View of Conceptual History,” Studies of East European Thought 60: 179–205. For a closer 
analysis of the concept of glasnost, see Michael S. Gorham (2014), “Glasnost Unleashed: Lan-
guage Ideologies in the Gorbachev Revolution,” in his book After Newspeak: Language 
Culture and Politics in Russia from Gorbachev to Putin (Cornell University Press), 48–75. On 
the political metaphors in the perestroika campaign, see Marina Kaul (1998), “Breakthrough 
and Blind Alley: The Lexicon of Perestroika,” in Political Discourse in Transition in Europe 
1989–1991, ed. Paul A. Chilton. Mikhail V. Ilyin, and Jacob L. Mey (Amsterdam and Phila-
delphia: John Benjamins), 95–111.  
70  Hent Kalmo (2010), “1988. aasta suveräänsusdeklaratsioon: silmakirjalikkuse tsiviliseeriv 
mõju,” Õpetatud Eesti Seltsi aastaraamat (Tartu: ÕES), 267–282. On the ESSR’s sovereignty 
declaration and its immediate “defense” in Moscow, see Mati Graf (2012), Impeeriumi lõpp 
ja Eesti taasiseseisvumine 1988–1991 (Argo), 20–48, and Igor Gräzin (2015) “Suveräänsuse 
sünd ja ja Nõukogude Liidu kadu,” Akadeemia, no. 11. For a recent study that places the 
ESSR’s sovereignty declaration in the context of the 1989 revolutions (as the “first velvet 
revolution” in Eastern Europe), see Toomas Alatalu (2019), “Eesti (NSV) suveräänsus-
deklaratsioonist,” Akadeemia, no. 9.  
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1989–1990.71 In Estonian, Erik Terk has written on the IME program and its 
relation with the Estonian Popular Front in 1988–1989.72 However, the intel-
lectual roots and analysis for the conceptual innovation of isemajandamine (Study 
II), and its entanglement with other concepts (Study III), have not been studied 
earlier.  
Now that we have gained an overview of the theoretical background and metho-
dology of the dissertation, let us clearly spell out its aim and research questions. 
The dissertation’s aim is to examine the processes of conceptual change in a pre-
revolutionary situation – how a concept can make space for other ideas, under 
what conditions the “conceptual innovation” is possible, and how a concept can 
be transferred from one disciplinary domain to another (which I call “conceptual 
transfer”). The dissertation analyzes all these interrelated processes in three publi-
cations (called “studies” in the text) and asks the following research questions: 
 
1.  How were “self-managerial relations” expanded through the economic experi-
ments in the mid-1980s in the Estonian SSR? What was the model of “self-
management” in the ESSR before its innovation in 1987?  
2.  Under what conditions and through what processes can the “conceptual inno-
vation” emerge in a late totalitarian society?  
3.  How did these processes enable the emergence of the concept of “sovereignty” 
in late 1987?  
4.  What kind of conceptual transfers (from science to politics) were made to legi-
timize the innovation in 1987–1988?  
5.  How was the global scientific discourse used in the local context to legitimize 
these actions? 
6.  What kinds of political languages can be discerned in public discussions in the 
ESSR during perestroika?  
 
We move now to our case. On the one hand, it illustrates the research debates 
described above (and what our new theoretical approach can contribute). On the 
other hand, it introduces the chronology of events in the Estonian SSR in 1987–
1988 (described in more detail in Studies II and III). 
  
                                                                          
71  Lars Fredrik Stöcker (2016), “Perestroika and the Economic ‘Westernization’ of the 
USSR: Soviet Estonian Market Pioneers and Their Nordic Partners,” Estonian Historical 
Journal, nos. 3–4: 447–476. 
72  Erik Terk and Liina Tõnisson (2018), “IME programm ja Rahvarinne: vastastikune 
võimendus,” Eestimaa Rahvarinne 30 (Rahvarinde muuseum), 132–158; Erik Terk (2016), 
“Eesti majandusreformid 1989–1991. IME programmist iseseisvuse ja selle kindlustamiseni,” 
Olid alles ajad! Taasiseseisvunud Eesti Vabariik 25 (Rahvarinde Muuseum), 11–45.  
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2. THE CASE AND ITS HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
2.1. From “self-management” to “sovereignty”  
in 1987–1988 
Two long years before Hungary’s Round Table Talks (March–September 1989), 
before Civic Forum and Vaclav Havel’s last arrest by the secret police in Prague 
in October 1989, and before the first mass demonstration in Romania in December 
1989, the first revolutionary situation in Eastern Europe, where “the contenders 
advance claims to control some segment of the state,” emerged in 1987 in Soviet 
Estonia. On September 26, 1987, a group of Estonian scientists published in the 
progressive local newspaper Edasi (Forward) a short article entitled “A Proposal: 
Estonian SSR to Full Self-Accounting” (Ettepanek – kogu Eesti NSV täielikule 
isemajandamisele).73 Four men were named in the byline (Siim Kallas, Tiit Made, 
Edgar Savisaar, and Mikk Titma), and thus the document was quickly named the 
“Four-Man Proposal” (Nelja mehe ettepanek).74 All four men were members of 
the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU).75 The proposal called upon the 
Estonian government and the scientific community to draft plans to achieve an 
independently operating economy in the union. The request declared the need for 
“a radical rearrangement of the Estonian economy and the society as a whole.” 
The proposal’s main message was that public debate should be started on how to 
gain “full self-accounting status” for the republic and how to place the economy 
(including all-union enterprises) on Estonian territory completely under the 
jurisdiction of the Estonian SSR. The article also proposed giving the republic its 
own currency (a “convertible ruble”). 
The Four-Man Proposal generated a torrent of articles from October 1987 until 
the end of 1988. The debate on “what it would take to carry out this transformation” 
took place every week, mostly in progressive newspapers, mobilizing reform-
minded top officials, intellectuals, and academics from very different fields. But 
most importantly, the local CPSU branch came out in favor of the idea. The 
reform-minded vice-chairman of the Council of Ministries, Indrek Toome, publicly 
endorsed the project and established a select expert group to develop the concept 
further at the beginning of 1988.76 The idea as a political demand for Moscow 
                                                                          
73  Siim Kallas, Tiit Made, Edgar Savisaar, and Mikk Titma, “Ettepanek – kogu Eesti NSV 
täielikule isemajandamisele,” Edasi, September 26, 1987. 
74  To shorten the proposal’s title, in the dissertation I also call the Four-Man Proposal the 
“IM Proposal” (IM – isemajandamine) and use the two terms interchangeably in the text.  
75  The Communist Party of Estonia (as a branch of the CPSU) was not an independent Party 
organization, and therefore people officially joined the CPSU. 
76  A year later, on December 1, 1988, in the meeting of the Council of Ministries, Indrek Toome 
said that “for Estonia, there is no alternative to territorial self-management.” Hindrek-Peeter 
Meri (2008), Tagasivaateid veerevast vagunist (Tartu: Ilmamaa), 447. All translations of the 
quotes (as well as the interviews) from Estonian to English in this dissertation have been made 
by the author, if not specified otherwise. 
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was exported to other Baltic republics as well. In the autumn of 1988, the 
governments of all three Baltic republics established a common platform to begin 
negotiations with Moscow to gain “economic independence” from central 
planning.  
 
Photo 1 (left): The title page of the proposal, published in the newspaper Edasi in 
September 26, 1987. Photo 2 (right): The four signatories of the proposal in the Estonian 
Television studio in spring 1988, from the left: Savisaar, Titma, Made, Kallas. In the 
background is a banner with the IME slogan with a territorial image of the Estonian SSR. 
Source: Wikipedia. 
 
Month after month, isemajandamine was gradually expanded (this is the main 
topic of Study II). The meanings that were initially connected only with economic 
policies (in late 1987) permeated the social and political sphere in early spring 
1988. The Tartu Group of Self-Management (Isemajandamise Tartu Grupp), con-
sisting of academics from various fields at the University of Tartu, stated in their 
first meeting on February 15, 1988, that “isemajandamine is not only an eco-
nomic but also a social and ideological problem […] the hope is that regulating 
the society’s economic base will also reactivate social mechanisms.”77 A funda-
mental shift in the rhetoric was the group’s statement that “the economy is only 
an instrument for the ultimate goals of isemajandamine,” which were the “increase 
of sovereignty and subjectivity, growth of welfare, increase of freedom of choice, 
etc.”78 The Tartu group also changed the abbreviation IM (isemajandamine) to 
                                                                          
77  Aivi Ross, “Isemajandamise Tartu rühm,” Edasi, March 19, 1988. 
78  Marju Lauristin, “Isemajandamisfoorum Tartus,” Edasi, April 29, 1988. 
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IME (Isemajandav Eesti) in spring 1988.79 In Estonian, “IME” literally means 
“miracle” (ime), which helped to give the movement a positive and creative 
image. During its peak (in summer 1988), IME gained an almost spiritual 
meaning in Estonia80 (illustrated by Photo 3). 
 
 
Photo 3: A banner from summer 1988, which reads: “IME. Let’s Love, Care For, and 
Protect Estonia.” Source: Wikipedia. 
 
By autumn 1988, IME had multiple simultaneous meanings, as initially economic 
demands had turned to political ones – it denoted a social movement, economic 
independence, social self-regulation, and political sovereignty.81 
                                                                          
79  One of the leaders of the IME movement, Marju Lauristin, recalls that “indeed, I held the 
chalk in a meeting in Tartu to write on the board a new abbreviation – IME” (author’s inter-
view with Marju Lauristin, 2020). In the dissertation, I distinguish the movement’s phases as 
IM (September 1987–January 1988) and IME (January 1988–November 1988). Edgar Savi-
saar himself drew a distinction between the content of the Four-Man Proposal and that of IME, 
saying in December 1989: “I would not equate the ‘self-management’ proposal made in Sep-
tember 1987 with IME, which came into being in spring 1988 and was qualitatively on a dif-
ferent level.” Kaupo Pollisinski and Raivo Lott (1989), “Aastalõpusimultaan nelja mehega 
majandusest ja muust,” Rahva Hääl, December 31, 1989, 7. 
80  In June 1989, when Estonian deputies met Gorbachev in Moscow to negotiate territorial 
self-management, one of the Estonian deputies, Viktor Palm, mentioned to Gorbachev: “In 
Estonia, people’s faith in IME is huge – it is like a religion at the moment.” Toomas Sildam 
and Leivi Šer (1989), “Eesti delegatsiooni suurpäev,” Rahva Hääl, June 2, 1989. 
81  There is a remarkable similarity between the discourse of “self-management from below in 
all social spheres” (as initiated by the Tartu Group of Self-Management in spring 1988) with 
the discourse of “organic self-management in the civic society” proposed by Czech dissidents 
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Indeed, from the perspective of world politics, the most important by-product 
of the mushrooming discourse on self-management was the revival of the forgotten 
concept of “sovereignty” at the end of 1987. An unintended consequence of the 
ongoing debate was that, together with economists, sociologists, and other 
academics, it also activated lawyers and legal scholars to present their views on the 
Four-Man Proposal. At first, the concept of “sovereignty” (in Estonian, suve-
räänsus) was brought into the debate by lawyers to remind economists what was 
necessary to establish full self-accounting in a republic.82 From there, lawyers 
started to make a supporting argument that “sovereignty” was a constitutional right 
of the republic (irrespective of the fact that, only a year earlier, this concept was 
not perceived by reformers to apply to the political arena). In September 1988, 
the politically and legally more useful term “sovereignty” replaced “self-manage-
ment” as the central concept in reformists’ tactics.83 However, the final maneuver 
was made due to a direct constitutional dispute with Gorbachev’s team, who 
demanded in mid-1988 that Estonia confirm the new amendments in the Soviet 
Union’s constitution. In response, on November 16, 1988, the Supreme Soviet of 
                                                                          
in the mid-1980s. For instance, in 1985, Czech dissident Petr Uhl, in his essay “The 
Alternative Community as Revolutionary Avant-garde” (published in English), explicitly says 
that “social (and not merely economic) self-management is a combination of direct and 
indirect forms of democracy”; see Petr Uhl and Paul Wilson (1985), “The Alternative 
Community as Revolutionary Avant-Garde,” International Journal of Politics 15, nos. 3–4: 
188–197. In the same year, another Czech dissident, Rudolf Battek, argued in favor of 
“different forms of self-management” and the need for “pluralizing sovereignty” in the society. 
According to Battek, “social structures can be democratized by expanding the elements of self-
management, limiting institutional growth, making allowances for ideas as motivational 
factor, and strengthening direct democracy by eliminating priorities and privileges.” See 
Rudolf Battek (1985), “Spiritual Values, Independent Initiatives and Politics,” in Vaclav 
Havel, The Power of the Powerless, ed. John Keane, 108. We can conceptualize this as republi-
can language, as it promoted direct democracy, people’s personal responsibility in relation to 
the state, and organic, “from below” initiave. The intriguing part is that whereas in East Central 
Europe, this “language” (in the Pocockian sense) was kept alive by dissidents, in the Estonian 
SSR, it emerged from the scientific community, in which many people were members of the 
Communist Party. On the relation between republicanism and East European dissident 
discourse, see Paul Blokker (2011), “Dissidence, Republicanism, and Democratic Change,” 
East European Politics and Societies 25, 219–243.  
82  In October 1987, lawyers joined the ongoing debate by saying that “the republic’s eco-
nomic self-accounting cannot be achieved without the republic’s sovereignty.” At first, Indrek 
Koolmeister stated that “speaking of being a master in your country, it is not only an economic 
but also a political-legal category […] to speak about the people as master at the state level 
means to talk about the sovereignty of people, about its power, and about the ways of its 
realization.” Indrek Koolmeister, “Isemajandamine ja ise majandamine,” Edasi, October 25, 
1987. 
83  During the 11th Plenum of the Estonian Communist Party in September 9–10, 1988, 
Estonian political scientist Andrus Park (a member of the CPSU and the ESSR’s Academy of 
Sciences) invited others “to pay attention to the legal-political questions in order to secure the 
ESSR’s economic independence,” stressing that “the key word for the IME movement from 
now on should be ‘sovereignty’ and only then ‘self-management.’” Rahva Hääl, September 
11, 1988, 3. 
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the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic (ESSR) adopted the Declaration of 
Sovereignty. The declaration asserted the ESSR’s “sovereignty” and Estonian 
laws’ primacy over those promulgated by Moscow’s all-union government. This 
step became a blueprint that was soon followed by virtually all other Soviet 
republics (including the Russian SFSR) and many autonomous republics who 
declared their “sovereignty” in 1989–1990.  
 
Thus, besides the well-known “Gorbachev factor,” there was an influential 
“sovereignty factor” behind the disintegration of the Soviet empire.84 Edward D. 
Walker has written the most meticulous study on the effect of the “sovereignty 
factor” on the USSR’s dissolution.85 Walker emphasized the importance of the 
sovereignty declarations adopted in 1988–1990, saying that  
 
“Sovereignty” killed the Soviet Union […] The concept of “sovereignty,” more 
than any other competitor such as “democracy,” “liberty,” or “markets,” was used 
with great effect by the anti-union opposition in the union’s republics to challenge 
the authority of the USSR’s central government.86  
 
The political efficiency of the concept was also highly esteemed by Boris Yeltsin, 
who recalled later that “as soon as the word ‘sovereignty’ resounded in the air… 
the last hour of the Soviet empire was chiming.”87 Throughout 1990, Boris Yeltsin 
presented “sovereignty” as a central concept in his speeches in RSFSR regions, 
calling on regions to declare their sovereignty.88  
                                                                          
84  Dragos Petrescu names three “external conjunctural factors” that were invoked in relation 
to the 1989 revolutions, namely, the “Vatican,” “Reagan,” and “Gorbachev” factors; see Dragos 
Petrescu (2014), Entangled Revolutions: The Breakdown of the Communist Regimes in East 
Central Europe (Editura Enciclopedică), 20. By the “Vatican” factor, Petrescu means the 1978 
election of a Polish pope, John Paul II (Karol Józef Wojtyła), which had a direct influence on 
dissident stances in Poland in the late 1970s and throughout the 1980s: ibid., 20. Surely we 
can add the “Helsinki factor” (or “Helsinki effect”) to this list as another influence for dissident 
strategies, but it is beyond the scope of this dissertation. On this topic, see Daniel C. Thomas 
(2001), The Helsinki Effect: International Norms, Human Rights and Demise of Communism 
(Princeton University Press). I myself have analyzed the Helsinki effect on Charter 77 tactics 
in Saharov (2021). 
85  Edward D. Walker (2003), Dissolution: Sovereignty and the Breakup of the Soviet Union 
(Rowman & Littlefield). For another analysis of the factor of sovereignty declarations in 
1989–1991 (focusing on opportunities for ASSRs), see Jeff Kahn (2000), “The Parade of 
Sovereignties: Establishing the Vocabulary of the New Russian Federalism,” Post-Soviet 
Affairs 16, no. 1: 58–89. 
86  Walker (2003), 1. 
87  Boris Yeltsin (1994), The Struggle for Russia, trans. by C. A. Fitzpatrick (New York: Times 
Books), 112. 
88  In the summer of 1989, Boris Yeltsin and Viktor Palm (an Estonian academic and activist 
in the Estonian Popular Front) were both members of the “Inter-Regional Group of Deputies” 
(Mezhregionalka), led by Andrei Sakharov. In his interview with Mati Graf, Viktor Palm 
recalls that during their meetings with Estonian deputies in Moscow, “Yeltsin was otherwise 
quite silent in our discussions but came to life when we introduced him the concept of 
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In his book, Walker represents the structuralist approach, saying that the dis-
solution of the Soviet Union was “a peculiar case of institutional path depen-
dency” where many laws and institutions had little or no practical meaning for 
decades and yet “sovereignty proved to be a legal boomerang that played a crucial 
role in the breakup of the Soviet state.”89 Walker also concluded that the previous 
administrative division and constitutional resources for the republics explains the 
nature of the dissolution – that is, “why the Soviet Union fragmented into fifteen, 
rather than five, or fifty, successor states.”90 Eventually, all 15 union republics 
(SSRs) in the Soviet Union and 26 different autonomous regions (including 
ASSRs) in the Russian SFSR adopted sovereignty declarations in 1988–1991.91 
This process, known as the “Parade of Sovereignties” (see the table below), put 
the central government at a serious disadvantage in its efforts to re-establish 




                                                                          
‘territorial self-management’ and ‘sovereignty’”; see Mati Graf (2012), Impeeriumi lõpp ja 
Eesti taasiseseisvumine 1988–1991 (Argo), 83. At the same time, Yeltsin took little interest 
in foreign policy and even less interest in concepts like “new thinking”; see Brown (2007), 
242. Thus, Yeltsin was interested in concepts that had potential in his domestic political 
struggle with Gorbachev and could bring practical results. 
89  Walker (2003), 186–187. 
90  Ibid., 1. For more on the “administrative division of USSR” as a structural factor that 
offered different opportunities for union republics and autonomous republics in 1988–1991 in 
the Soviet Union, see Gregory P. Williams (2010), “When Opportunity Structure Knocks: 
Social Movements in the Soviet Union and Russian Federation,” Social Movement Studies 9, 
no. 4: 443–460.  
91  For the analysis on the “sovereignty effect” in ASSRs (which focuses on the Tatarstan 
ASSR), see Jeff Kahn (2000). 
92  Keeping in mind Mark Katz’s concept of “affiliate revolutions” for describing the 1989 
revolutions (Katz 1999), but also Mark Kramer’s concept of “uni- and bidirectional spillovers” 
(Kramer 2003), we can elaborate the “parade of sovereignties” in the same way. The decla-
rations inspired each other as the opposition politicians communicated with each other in all 
republics, causing a cascade of declarations in 1989–1990. One ESSR Supreme Soviet mem-
ber, economist Valter Udam, recalls that during the session when sovereignty was declared on 
November 16, 1988, colleagues from other republics phoned constantly to inquire about the 
election’s result. Valter Udam (1993), Taasiseseisvumise raske tee ehk Vene impeeriumi lagu-
nemise algus (Ilo), 36. Estonian management scholar Erik Terk (who visited Slovenia several 
times in 1990–1992 with Estonian prime minister Savisaar) recalls that the text of the Slo-
venian sovereignty declaration (the May Declaration, published on May 10, 1989) was 
inspired by the Estonian equivalent and that many paragraphs in that text were directly copied 
from the Estonian declaration: author’s interview with Erik Terk (Tallinn, May 11, 2018). This 
claim requires further study, but there was certainly a common bilateral interest in those 
processes, as the legal situation for Slovenian independence forces (to secede from the 
Yugoslav federation) was reminiscent of that of the ESSR. 
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The “Parade of Sovereignties” (SSRs): 
 
1988 1989 1990 







Lithuania May 18 
Latvia  July 29 
Azerbaijan  Sept. 23 
Georgia  Oct. 12 
Byelorussia  Dec. 7 
Russian SFSR June 12 
Uzbekistan June 20 
Moldavia June 23 
Ukraine July 16 
Turkmenistan Aug. 22 
Armenia Aug. 23 
Tajikistan Aug. 25 
Kazakhstan Oct. 26 
Kirghizia Oct. 28 
 
While the importance of the “sovereignty effect” on the dissolution of the Soviet 
Union has been acknowledged, some of its questions remain unanswered. For 
instance, why did it happen first in Estonia and not in other Soviet republics? 
Why did the concept of “sovereignty” rise to prominence in Estonia in late 1987 
at all? What was the reason for this particular development in the ESSR on the 
all-union scale?  
As we saw from the process described above (and Studies II and III analyze 
its multiple facets exhaustively), the main point is that even though in November 
1988 the “sovereignty of the ESSR” was declared on the grounds of the ESSR’s 
constitutional rights, its unexpected “emergence” in late 1987 was related to 
something else. The rebirth of “sovereignty” in Estonia was caused by the need 
to form a legal basis for the project of “republican self-management.” In other 
words, in 1987–1988, “sovereignty” was supposed to serve the goal of “self-
management” and not vice versa. Estonian legal scholars who brought the 
“sovereignty of the republic” into the public sphere emphasized in November 
1987 that “republican self-management presumes the sovereignty of the republic 
to expand its rights… and using the constitutional rights that ensure sovereignty 
is not only the republic’s right but also its duty.”93 “Self-management” became a 
central political concept in the ESSR from September 1987 onwards, before it 
was replaced by its local successor, “sovereignty,” in late 1988. It was an unin-
tended conceptual consequence of the gradually expanding debate on republican 
self-management in 1987 (which in the Soviet Union existed only in Estonia). As 
a next step, it facilitated the emergence of the ESSR’s sovereignty claim in 1988. 
Thus, to understand the spread of “sovereignty” in Soviet republics in 1987–
1989, one should pay attention not only to constitutional factors but also to why 
the new claim arose, what its relation was to other concepts in the ongoing debate, 
                                                                          
93  Igor Gräzin and Peeter Kask, “Isemajandamisest ja suveräniteedist,” Edasi, November 13, 
1987. See also Indrek Koolmeister, “Isemajandamine ja ise majandamine,” Edasi, October 25, 
1987; and Gunnar Kuldvere interview with Urve Nõu, Heino Siigur, Tõnu Anton, Enn 
Hansberg, and Indrek Koolmeister, “Majanduslik ja õiguslik iseseisvus on lahutamatud,” 
Edasi, December 8, 1987. 
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and what the contextual resources were that made it possible to create those 
preceding claims in the first place. Below is a figure (Figure 1) which schemati-
cally presents the dissertation’s analytical framework for studying the conceptual 
processes in the ESSR: 
 
Figure 1: Conceptual innovation in the ESSR. The revolutionary period (i.e. the era of dual 
power) in the ESSR starts with the adoption of the sovereignty declaration on Novem-
ber 16, 1988. 
 
 
2.2. The “locked-text problem” in a late totalitarian system 
Michael Gorham, the researcher of language ideologies of Russian history, has 
said that the “periods of rapid and radical change both shape and are shaped by 
language.”94 But what does it mean for a language to be shaped and itself shape 
change? What if the language during these periods is still very much “locked” by 
the prevailing ideology, and unlocking it poses a challenge? How could various 
native languages in other Soviet republics be manipulated to take advantage of 
these situations? These are the questions to be tackled in this chapter. 
The period of 1985–1988 in the ESSR (as in the Soviet Union generally) was 
a period of “rapid and radical change” indeed, and language played a significant 
role in it. According to Gorbachev’s chief advisor Alexander Yakovlev (the 
leading architect of the perestroika campaign), one of the first goals of this 
campaign in 1985 was to cancel out the empty rhetoric (pustoslovie) of the existing 
party language (partgosiazyk) and to restore seriousness to political speech.95 For 
                                                                          
94  Michael S. Gorham (2014), After Newspeak: Language Culture and Politics in Russia 
from Gorbachev to Putin (Cornell University Press). 
95  Ibid., 48–49. 
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Yakovlev, it was located in progressive, uncensored science, and the new campaign 
attempted to push for reform based on scientific methods, set free from ideologi-
cal constraints.96 This was in line with academic Andrei Sakharov’s call to “free 
science from its chains.” Yakovlev and Gorbachev believed that if they could bring 
together the best representatives of the sciences, they could articulate a broad 
vision of reforms. This pattern in Soviet reformism had its roots in the early and 
mid-1960s, when various economists were involved in Chairman Kosygin’s 
drafts for economic reform.97 A few years after perestroika, Yakovlev confessed 
that he bought into the “illusion” that all they needed was to “gather as full and 
reliable information as possible, analyze it strictly scientifically and then act in a 
corresponding way – in that case, everything will go in the necessary direction, 
an honest and reasonable policy will be formed.”98  
With his Finnish colleague Pekka Sutela, the Russian economist Vladimir Mau 
has labeled this mindset an “objectivity illusion” when analyzing Soviet economic 
policy during perestroika.99 This produced significant changes in the public lan-
guage. Due to the replacement of the chief editors by Yakovlev in 1985–1986, 
many statements in periodicals and scientific reviews in the Soviet Union started 
to make a similar assumption – that scientifically valid knowledge (freed from ideo-
logical restraints) on history, the economy, and society could and should provide 
direct guidance for efficient policy-making.100 The promised liberation of science 
created a new type of linguistic situation for the reformist authors – writings on 
economic reform were (from then on) often built on progressive scientific argu-
ments. However, besides the presumed “scientificity,” the reform proposals in the 
public speech had to meet a second condition – they had to comply with the new 
ideology itself. Next, I will take a closer look at this condition in the speech 
situation in 1985–1987.  
Although perestroika proclaimed the need for “new thinking” to overcome the 
economic (and moral) crisis, the speech situation for authors in the public media 
in the early years of the campaign (1985–1987) did not change dramatically. As 
Avizier Tucker put it, the Soviet Union in 1987 was still a late totalitarian 
society.101 I am not applying here the transitological approach (by which the 
                                                                          
96  A similar call – to restore the seriousness of “political language” based on scientific 
analysis – was made in the mid-1980s in some other socialist countries as well, such as in 
Yugoslavia by Serbian sociologist Slobodan Inić (1946–2000) in his 1984 book Govorite li 
politićki? Esej iz sociologije politićkog jezika (Belgrade). See Trencsényi et al. (2018), 34. 
97  Iakov Feygin (2017), “Reforming the Cold War State: Economic Thought, Internatio-
nalization, and the Politics of Soviet Reform, 1955–1985” (PhD diss., University of Penn-
sylvania), 97–98.  
98  Alexander Yakovlev, cited in Pekka Sutela and Vladimir Mau (1998), “Economics under 
Socialism: The Russian Case,” in Economic Thought in Communist and Post-Communist 
Europe, ed. H. J. Wagener (Routledge), 205.  
99  Sutela and Mau (1998), 205. 
100  Atnashev (2010), 139. 
101  Avizier Tucker (2015), The Legacies of Totalitarianism: A Theoretical Framework 
(Cambridge University Press), 7–10. According to Tucker, this distinction helps in separating 
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totalitarian regimes’ institutional past influences its societies’ transition to demo-
cratic political culture), but I aim to show the public authors’ speech situation 
during the early perestroika era. In 1985–1987, all public media and the public 
language production were still monopolized by a single political party, even if it 
had changed some of its rhetoric. A public text had to meet strict rules; therefore, 
the state censored public text during the early perestroika era. Most importantly, 
the authors themselves arguably perceived the extensive low-intensity oppression 
through the censorship rules on public text, even when the state was softening 
censorship in 1987. In other words, even if the state opted not to censor some of 
the terms or arguments anymore, the authors believed and feared that the state 
might continue to do so.102 Thus it was a late-totalitarian-era speech situation that 
led public authors to develop their self-censorship skills and operate only in the 
hierarchical Soviet public text’s discourse.  
However, there were ways to navigate between these rules. Estonian commu-
nication theorist Maarja Lõhmus has described this phenomenon as innovating 
the “text in a locked system”.103 Drawing on editing practices in the Estonian 
SSR’s media in 1983–1984, Lõhmus concludes that despite the system’s closed 
and hierarchical nature, innovation and creativity in the public text were obligatory 
features for late Soviet ideology. Editors even encouraged writers to display the 
                                                                          
regimes that exercise “extensive low-intensity oppression” over the whole population (late 
totalitarianism) from regimes that exercise “narrow but intensive oppression” over a small, 
politically active section of the population (authoritarianism). Authoritarian regimes base their 
power on the military, while totalitarian regimes rely on the secret service. In our case, we can 
use this distinction to emphasize the importance of authors’ fear of possible persecution and 
thus their cultivation of self-censorship (in 1985–1987) and the constant navigation between 
the rules for the public text. Tucker’s notion of “late totalitarianism” (and its contents) overlaps 
considerably with Vaclav Havel’s notion of “post-totalitarian society,” in which ordinary 
citizens, out of a fear of persecution (as part of the totalitarian control-mechanism), participate 
in reproducing the communist ideology. Although their tactics were different, dissidents and 
perestroika reformers confronted the same challenge – how to meaningfully criticize the ultra-
centralist, late totalitarian regime and how to communicate that criticism in a way that would 
avoid persecution. The “totalitarian” nature of the late-era Soviet Union was also elaborated 
by Vladimir Shlapentokh (1926–2015), who stressed the factor of “fear” for the people’s 
behaviour in the Soviet society in the early and mid-1980s, see Vladimir Shlapentokh (2001), 
A Normal Totalitarian Society: How the Soviet Union Functioned and How It Collapsed 
(Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe).  
102  One of the economists in the IME movement, Ivar Raig, worked as the editor of the eco-
nomic column “Idee” (Idea) in the newspaper Noorte Hääl (Voice of the Youth) in December 
1987. He described the situation thus: “At the end of 1987, I and the writers at the newspaper 
never got complaints or orders from the censors, but I think it was because our own self-censor-
ship in writing was so strong.” Author’s interview with Ivar Raig, February 12, 2019. 
103  Maarja Lõhmus (1999), Toimetamine: kas looming või tsensuur (Tartu Ülikooli Kirjastus), 
61–63. In her PhD dissertation, Lõhmus analyzed censorship practices in Estonian Radio in 
1983–1985: see Maarja Lõhmus (2002), “Transformation of Public Text in Totalitarian System: 
A Socio-Semiotic Study of Soviet Censorship Practices in Estonian Radio in the 1980s” 
(University of Turku). 
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state’s progressiveness and continuously “developing socialism.”104 Next, I will 
look at some of the concepts (“critique,” “improvement,” “experiment,” and 
“plan”) that had a paradoxical nature in the late totalitarian speech situation. 
In the public text, the availability of the concept and practice of the “critique” 
in the late totalitarian discourse provided an opportunity to introduce new ideas 
that differed from the official ideology. The concept of “critique” in Soviet text 
meant introducing some “alien” ideology or theory only to demolish it.105 As 
Study III in the dissertation shows, while in his 1983 book (co-authored with 
Lembit Valt), Savisaar introduced and “criticized” the Club of Rome (Rooma 
Klubi) and its relations with global studies, he managed to link it with “humanistic 
and socialist values,” “progressiveness,” and “common global goals” (e.g., the 
common threat of nuclear war), which were precursors of perestroika language.106 
More importantly for our case, Savisaar imported the argumentative language of 
the Club of Rome into the language of institutional policymaking in the Estonian 
Planning Committee (ENSV Plaanikomitee) in 1986 (see Study III). The planning 
institutions themselves partially enabled this: when Savisaar was nominated in 
1986 as department chief of the Plan Committee, his department’s official task 
was to come up regularly with improvement proposals within the system of a 
planned economy. The ideological job to “constantly improve the economic 
mechanisms” through the economic experiments started to pay dividends to 
Estonian marketeers by the early 1980s (for more details, see Chapter 2.4). The 
fourth example is the concept of “plan.” In the 1985 contractual work experiment, 
before an independent budget could be acquired for contract units in services in 
the ESSR, the plan first needed to be exceeded (see Study I). In other words, the 
more contractual units fulfilled and exceeded the plan indicators, the more their 
economic independence grew. Thus, the concept of the “plan” not only con-
strained but also enabled the departure from a vertical command economy to a 
more horizontal market socialism.107 
                                                                          
104  Lõhmus (1999), 61–63. 
105  Ibid., 17. 
106 Lembit Valt and Edgar Savisaar (1983), Globaalprobleemid ja tulevikustsenaariumid 
(Eesti Raamat). 
107  We can analyze this phenomenon in the late totalitarian regimes with the help of the ana-
lytical concept of “institutional amphibiousness,” borrowing it from X. L. Ding’s analysis on 
the role of state institutions in the reform process in China in the 1980s. As Ding observed, it 
applies if “an institution can be used for purposes contrary to those it is supposed to fulfil, and 
the same institution can simultaneously serve conflicting purposes” (298). According to Ding, 
this situation led to a process of “institutional manipulation” whereby institutions that “were set 
up by the communist regime for its own use” were “gradually co-opted by critical forces for 
counter purposes, all the while keeping up the protective facade that these were still party-
state institutions” (299): X. L. Ding (1994), “Institutional Amphibiousness and the Transition 
from Communism: The Case of China,” British Journal of Political Science 24, no. 3: 293–
318. For instance, as shown in Studies I and III, we can see the ESSR’s Institute of Ministry 
of Services in 1983–1985 (in Study I) or the ESSR’s Plan Committee scenario department in 
1986–1987 (in Study III) as an example of this double life, described by Ding. I suggest that 
we can expand Ding’s concept to grasp the consequences of the usage of some particular action 
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Aside from the ideological and practical tasks for editors, experts, and 
marketeers (in newspapers, planning institutions, and ministries), we can explain 
this at a more theoretical level. Alexei Yurchak points out that the high “perfor-
mativity” of using the official vocabulary in late socialism (the gradual “hyper-
normalization” of the discourse) was precisely the reason why it was possible to 
manipulate the meanings by reinterpreting the existing “official” terms.108 There-
fore, “reinterpretation” in the late totalitarian system does not mean changing the 
previous meaning but continually modifying it within the frontiers of closed text. 
The constant modification of the concepts in the Soviet media was supposed to 
create the illusion of an ever-changing and developing society. However, this 
process gradually left these concepts hollowed out from any meaning that could 
be taken seriously. In the beginning, perestroika’s campaign was part of that 
process. It was a modification of the old concepts in the ideological framework. 
Many intellectuals indeed accused the perestroika language of creating half-truths 
and being too conservative and technocratic.109 However, as shown in Study II, 
because of this hollowness, this situation enabled several “speech acts,” which 
eventually had unintended outcomes. 
Thus, the first years of perestroika did not differ much from the logic of 
innovation processed in the media in the late totalitarian system. There was also 
a range of taboo topics (like the Yugoslav model, Kosygin reforms, and the Soli-
darity movement) that could not be touched upon publicly and which led to the 
development of self-censorship skills.110 The progressive ideas in perestroika 
                                                                          
models in the late Soviet system (“critique,” “improvement,” “experiment,” and “plan”), as 
their “conceptual amphibiousness” made it possible to serve conflicting purposes in the society 
simultaneously. 
108  Alexei Yurchak (2006), Everything Was Forever, Until It Was No More (Princeton Uni-
versity Press), 76.  
109  Even the project of isemajandamine itself became an object of attacks by more radically 
minded intellectuals in the Estonian SSR, as well as by an independent youth movement (Noorte-
foorum). The discourse that categorized the “self-management” project as one of the “half-
truths” (created by the “Komsomol generation” of the 1960s) was generated in 1988–1989. 
See, for example, Harri Liivrand and Ants Juske (1988), “Tallinna Kevad 88 ja Eesti Sõltu-
matu Noortefoorum,” Vikerkaar 10, 58; and Kaido Kama (1989), “Rahvuslikke perspektiive,” 
Vikerkaar 5, 91–93.  
110  Those in the Soviet bloc carefully avoided comparing – even in 1989 – the Estonian SSR’s 
“territorial self-management” concept with Polish and Yugoslavian models of “workers’ self-
management.” Estonian management scholar and IME activist Erik Terk recalls that during 
his visit to Bulgaria in 1989 (to introduce the IME program to the Bulgarian economic experts), 
when he translated isemajandamine into English, the local reformers were startled and careful 
to use the term “self-management.” This was the case because of the term’s known relation 
with the Yugoslavian model, which was taboo in orthodox communist ideology (from corres-
pondence with Erik Terk, November 2020). Similarly, Ivar Raig has recalled that the Four-
Man Proposal in September 1987 carefully avoided a reference to the “Yugoslav model,” and 
even “the reference to Hungarian experience in the proposal’s text had to be balanced by adding 
‘Bulgarian’ alongside the former because of the 1956 events” as another taboo in the Soviet 
public text (from the author’s interview with Ivar Raig, February 12, 2019). Indeed, during 
the public debate on the proposal, which generated more than 50 newspaper articles in 1987–
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language were displayed through a limited amount of “approved” concepts, 
which had to be compatible with classic texts of Lenin, decrees of the general 
secretary of the Party, work of the Soviet academics, eminent international 
scientists in the natural sciences (e.g., Nobel Prize winners), Soviet economic 
discourse from the 1920s (the NEP), and so on. According to Kristian Petrov, this 
was precisely the goal of perestroika – to produce “an open matrix that could be 
filled with different projections of alternative visions [...] intended to work only 
in the given context,” which was the socialist ideology and Soviet system.111 
Metaphorically speaking, the task for the innovational ideologists of perestroika 
resembled the situation called the “locked-room mystery” for detectives in crime 
novels, where the solution to the puzzle can be found only on the basis of people’s 
actions inside the room and not outside it. Like everyone who wrote in the Soviet 
public media, the Estonian authors faced the “locked-text problem” in 1986–1987.  
 
 
2.3. The nature of perestroika’s concepts 
As described in the section on the theoretical framework, different generations of 
scholars have conceptualized the revolutions through (1) structural factors (as 
“social revolutions”), (2) ideational factors (e.g., “existential revolutions”), 
(3) transnational factors (as “entangled revolutions”), and (4) linguistic-conceptual 
factors (as “conceptual revolutions”), which is the case when analyzing the early 
and mid-perestroika period. In the previous chapter, we also saw how the “empty 
rhetoric” of the party language was supposed to be replaced by a new political 
language that would rely heavily on scientific argumentation, scrubbed of 
ideological content. However, the ideological control and censorship that had 
created the “locked-text problem” continued with perestroika in 1985–1987. 
The usage of the terms had the utmost importance in the Soviet system. During 
early perestroika, there were occasionally all-day meetings in the CPSU’s Polit-
buro to discuss how to address some terms in Soviet political speak.112 Even the 
general secretary himself had to confront the “locked-text problem.” For instance, 
in 1985, Gorbachev could not use the term “reform” because of its Western origin 
and the taboo status of the Kosygin reforms in the public space during the 
                                                                          
1988, the author found only one piece that mentioned the IM concept’s similarity with “the 
Yugoslavian developments”: see Ago Vilu (1987), “Asi on üritamist väärt,” Õhtuleht, Octo-
ber 1, 1987. These examples illustrate the ESSR’s authors’ constant navigation to avoid the 
taboo topics in the Soviet locked-text discourse and how tactical (and crucial) the linguistic 
conceptualization of reform drafts was during the early and mid-perestroika period in public 
space. 
111  Petrov (2008), 200. Petrov points out that the literal meaning of the word “perestroika” 
(restructuring) is to “produce changes within the construction”: ibid., 200.  
112  Archie Brown (2009), The Rise and Fall of Communism (London: Bodly Head), 489. 
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Brezhnev era.113 That is why technically sound and politically neutral concepts 
like “acceleration” (uskorenie), “breakdown” (lomka), and “dismantlement” (de-
montaž) were created by Gorbachev’s team in 1985–1986. They were made as a 
safe set of concepts for introducing the new campaign.  
In Leon Aron’s words, “Gorbachev and his initial allies had been brought up 
in the Marxist tradition… and [therefore] lacked the conceptual categories and 
even a vocabulary to give coherence to their ‘non-material’ concerns.”114 Simi-
larly to Aron, Walker D. Connor noted in 2005 that  
 
There was a continuing thread of discrepancy between the language Gorbachev 
used, including its ideological tint, and the content and tendency of his actions… 
to a degree, this was tactical – he could not show his hand to the Party. But it also 
highlights the deficiency of the political vocabulary available to him in the mid-
1980s, which made it difficult for him to express how far he was willing to go, or 
perhaps even to understand it himself.115 
 
I suggest that we should see this “deficit” in the political language also as an 
opportunity for proposing reforms. The limitations of the official vocabulary were 
one reason why Yakovlev and Gorbachev turned to progressive science. The politi-
cal neutrality of the system-theory concepts made it possible not only to present 
the “ideologically free reforms” but also, in a more practical sense, to fight the 
hardliners in the CPSU by creating a new public linguistic platform. The socio-
logists and economists on Gorbachev’s team equipped him with system-theory 
concepts like “feedback” or “self-regulation” that he could use in his speeches 
(some of which were written by the scientists themselves), which in turn allowed 
scientists to expand the concepts in the public sphere.116 It led to a tripartite eco-
system between the general secretary, reformist scientists, and the public. It was 
a functional circle by which scientific language migrated into the public sphere. 
                                                                          
113  Mikhail Gorbachev, Memoirs (1996). Similarly to Gorbachev, those in Czechoslovakia 
avoided the word “reform” in the 1980s so as not to affiliate themselves with the reform com-
munists of 1968; see Ther (2018), 55. 
114  Aron (2012), 23. Aron probably has in mind the orthodox Marxist-Leninist classics in Soviet 
public text, because we can interpret the notion of “Marxist tradition” in a much wider sense, 
for instance, the theorists in the Frankfurt School, who certainly had the conceptual framework 
for elaborating “ethical and non-material concerns.” Besides, Gorbachev was sympathetic 
toward Eurocommunism and had a friendly relationship with Zdeněk Mlynář; see English 
(2000), 181. Rather, the restriction on using unorthodox Marxist vocabulary was related more 
to the strong resistance from the conservative wing in the CPSU (even during perestroika) and 
the inertial “locked-text problem” in a late totalitarian system. 
115  Walker D. Connor (2005), “Builder and Destroyer: Thoughts on Gorbachev’s Social Revo-
lutions, 1985–1991,” Demokratizatsiya 13, no. 2: 174. 
116  One of the leading public figures during perestroika, sociologist Tatyana Zaslavskaya, has 
noted that she belonged to Gorbachev’s speechwriters’ team in 1987. See Tatyana Zaslavskaya 
(2007), Moia zhizn’: vospominaniia i razmyshleniia. Izbrannye proizvedeniia, vol. 3 (Moscow: 
Ekonomika), 554. 
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However, the “conceptual revolution” Brown had in mind was related to 
concepts from the realms of economics and law. During perestroika, in 1989, 
Archie Brown noted that Gorbachev and his allies used three “new concepts” in 
1987–1988, which, according to Brown, “deserve special emphasis, as they helped 
to open space for new political activity and provide a theoretical underpinning 
for some of the concrete reforms that the more radical interpreters of perestroika 
were attempting to implement.”117 These were (1) “socialist pluralism” (sotsia-
listicheskiy plyuralizm) as a pluralism of opinion;118 (2) “state based on the rule 
of law” (pravovoe gosudarstvo); and (3) “checks and balances” (sderzhek i proti-
vovesov) as separation of powers.119 All three received the endorsement of 
Gorbachev, which corroborates Brown’s claim about “the revolution from above.” 
However, I suggest that there were further layers within the conceptual revolution 
described by Brown, and that we need to note some critical reinterpretations of 
perestroika concepts “from below.” This is where the processes in the Estonian 
SSR and “intended” manipulations with its native language come into play.  
Khozraschet was an old Soviet concept. It was related to economic units in the 
planned economy and denoted the “self-accounting” of an individual enterprise 
(also translated as “self-sufficiency” or “cost-accounting” in English). In 1941, 
when the Soviets first occupied Estonia, khozraschet was translated into Estonian 
as isemajandamine.120 In Soviet economic vocabulary, its roots date back to 1921, 
when Lenin and Bukharin explained the basis of the New Economic Policy (NEP) 
in terms of the “system of khozraschet.”121 To work “on khozraschet” meant that 
a given economic unit had achieved self-sufficiency, in which costs were covered 
from the unit’s profits, that is, independently of state directives. After the NEP, 
the term was revived during the Sovnarkhoz reform, the “Lieberman discussions”,  
 
                                                                          
117  Brown (2007), 112–113. 
118  Brown describes how Gorbachev took bold step of publicly embracing the concept of 
“pluralism” in mid-1987. According to Brown, “the notion of pluralism had been the subject 
of so many attacks by Soviet leaders and ideologists since it was adopted by ‘Prague Spring’ 
intellectuals in the late 1960s and by ‘Eurocommunists’ in the 1970s that it would have been 
difficult for anyone other than the top leader to break the taboo on endorsing it”: Brown (2007), 
110. However, the notion was first reinterpreted by Gorbachev as the “socialist pluralism of 
opinions” (in July 1987), and it was not used in a broader sense before July 1988, during the 
19th Conference of the CPSU (as “political pluralism,” which also meant the acceptance of a 
multiparty system): ibid. In this case, “socialist pluralism” (alongside “economic pluralism”) 
was stretched into “political pluralism” in 1988. “Economic pluralism” (as a pluralism of dif-
ferent ownership forms) also emerged in the ESSR in 1987. 
119  Ibid., 112. However, Brown ignores khozraschet not only in the ESSR in 1987 but also in 
the Soviet central press in 1987, neglecting, for instance, (at least in 1989) Nikolai Smelev’s 
articles. 
120  Plaanimajandus. Majanduspoliitiline ajakiri (1941), no. 1. 
121  Vladimir Ilyich Lenin (1984) Polnoe Sobranie Socheneniia [Complete Collected Works] 
(Moscow), vol. 44, 342. 
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and the Kosygin reform plans in the mid-1960s.122 However, in the early period 
of perestroika, the term khozraschet returned to the Soviet economic debate, 
perhaps most powerfully with pro-perestroika economist Nikolai Smelev’s article 
“Advances and Debts” (“Avansy i dolgi”) in Novyi Mir in June 1987.123 From mid-
1987 onwards, Gorbachev incorporated the term into his programmatic vocabu-
lary and frequently spoke of the need for “full cost accounting in enterprises” 
(polnyi khozraschet predpriyatii).124 For instance, in his June 1987 speech in the 
CPSU Plenum, Gorbachev proposed that all state enterprises work “on full self-
accounting and self-financing” starting in 1988. 
Smelev described khozraschet as more than just an accounting term. As he 
saw it, the NEP marked the transition from “administrative socialism” to “khozra-
schet socialism.”125 However, in official Soviet economic discourse, the term still 
had a very technical meaning. It regulated only the management forms and hier-
archial relations within the economic units. For instance, khozraschet’s qualifiers 
were “internal” (in Russian, vnutrennyi; in Estonian, sisemine) and “full” (in Rus-
sian, polnyi; in Estonian, täielik). Vnutrennyi khozraschet (internal self-accounting) 
was a management form in which only a small individual unit within a collective 
farm or enterprise (such as a brigade) had khozrachet status. In contrast, in polnyi 
khozraschet (full self-accounting), the whole enterprise or farm worked as an 
economically self-managing unit.  
Thus “full self-accounting” was used everywhere in the Soviet Union only as 
a technical accounting term, referring to the enterprises’ obligation to operate 
without losses and not to anything else. That was also the case with the Estonian 
SSR until 1987, when the Four-Man Proposal radically deconstructed the conven-
tional meaning of khozraschet. In Skinner’s terms, the proposal “transformed a 
neutral into a favourable term (by metaphorical extension) and applied it in virtue 
of its extended meaning to describe the course of action you wish to see com-
mended.” In terms of classical rhetoric, Study II describes this as a “catachrestical 
move,” whereas Skinner, in his work, has instead leaned toward investigating the 
rhetorical form of paradiastole (the reframing of vice as a virtue). The 
                                                                          
122  Kharkiv’s professor of economics, Yevsei Lieberman (1897–1981), was the first figure who, 
following Stalin’s death, brought khozraschet back to the economic debate with his 1955 
paper “Khoziaistvennyi raschet i materialnoe pooshrenie rabotnikov promishl’nnosti” (Cost 
Accounting and Material Encouragement of Industrial Personnel), published in Voprosy 
ekonomiki, no. 6, 1955. On the “Lieberman discussions,” see p. 39. 
123  Nikolai Smelev (1995 [1987] “Advances and Debts,” in The Soviet System: From Crisis 
to Collapse, ed. Alexander Dallin and Gail W. Lapidus (Westview Press), 261–271 (translated 
from “Avansy i dolgi,” Novyi Mir no. 6, 1987). Many observers have identified Smelev’s article 
as the “main opener” of the public debate on economic reforms in the Soviet Union. Through 
Smelev’s article, the NEP (a taboo subject during the Brezhnev era) was brought back to the 
public sphere as the Leninist economic model. In mid-1987, Gorbachev himself promoted the 
NEP as “an instructive model for future development”: see Petrov (2008), 186. 
124  Mikhail Gorbachev (1987), Perestroika: New Thinking for Our Country and the World 
(New York: Harper and Row), 88–89.  
125  Smelev (1995 [1987]), 263. 
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catachrestical move was made on two levels. The first was in September 1987, 
when the Four-Man Proposal lifted it from the individual-unit (enterprise) level 
to the territorial (republican) level. The second took place in spring 1988 in the 
Tartu Group of Self-Management and the IME Council, when the concept was 
expanded from the strictly economic level into a much broader social sphere. This 
move is the main content of the action, which I call “conceptual innovation” – 
changing the available concept so that it departs radically from its original set of 
meanings and constitutes a conceptual platform for the new political claims. 
Although Gorbachev’s vocabulary was limited, we see that some of its con-
cepts were elastic and manipulable. As early as 1989, the Sovietologist Anders 
Åslund stated that “instead of changing terminology, Gorbachev redefines it… it 
would be foolhardy to try to establish firm definitions of these intentionally elastic 
concepts… we have to check their meaning in each context.”126 Thus, instead of 
importing concepts from the West, Gorbachev and reform-minded Soviet 
economists (like the aforementioned Nikolai Smelev) reinterpreted and extended 
their own “Soviet concepts” from socialist economic thought. They relied on the 
intellectual reservoirs from previous decades (including the NEP and Sovnarkhoz 
reform), legitimated by the glasnost policy that started in 1986. However, as the 
perestroika concepts had only “limited elasticity,” which allowed them to stretch 
out only within the context of socialist ideology, they threatened to snap. In the 
end, by disrupting the meaning of khozraschet, the Estonian reformers set in 
motion unforeseeable processes for Gorbachev’s team.  
The aforementioned catachrestical move also had a specific linguistic resource. 
The Estonian term isemajandamine had the prefix “self-” (ise-), which made it 
remarkably similar to another Estonian term, iseseisvus (“independence”). The 
prefix was missing not only in the Russian word khozraschet but also in its 
translations to the native languages in other Soviet republics. This particular re-
source explains (but only partially) why the conceptual innovation of khozraschet 
happened in the ESSR and not, for example, in other Baltic republics. Study II 
shows why this linguistic resource can be considered an essential factor, as trans-
lations into other native languages did not start to resonate in the other republics.127 
                                                                          
126  Anders Åslund (1989), Gorbachev’s Struggle for Economic Reform: The Soviet Reform 
Process, 1985–88 (Cornell University Press), 2. During the early and mid-perestroika period, 
Åslund also worked as an economic diplomat at the Swedish embassy in Moscow. 
127  Although there were plenty of Russian terms with the prefix “self-” (such as samooku-
payemost, samostoyatelnost, samoupravleniye, and samofinansirovaniye, which were con-
stantly used in the perestroika economic discourse), the concept of vabariiklik isemajandamine 
was translated back to Russian in 1987 as republikanskii khozraschet; see, for instance, Arno 
Köörna (1988), “Respublikanskii khozraschet: shelaniya i realnost,” Sovetskaya Estoniya, 
February 24, 1988; which initiated the next article by Jaroslav Tolstikov (1988), “Respubli-
kanskii khozraschet: dalekaya perspektiva ili realnost?” Sovetskaya Estoniya, April 17, 1988. 
It formed a suitable linguistic platform for the Estonian Communist Party to negotiate with 
Moscow, as khozraschet was part of Gorbachev’s campaign and speeches. I suggest that the 
processes in the ESSR in 1988 were monitored in Moscow through the ESSR’s Russian-
language media, and that is why the “backward translation” in the ESSR’s newspapers (like 
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In terms of its “secessionist claim,” the misuse of an economic term in such a 
consequential way was exceptional not only in the Soviet Union but also throug-
hout Eastern Europe. Even though the alternative reform proposals were common 
acts in the repertoire of this region’s reformist elite in the mid- and late 1980s,128 
none of them proposed economic secession on a territorial basis.129 Prior to the 
1989 revolutions, it was an innovative, unique rhetorical move with direct and 
practical consequences, as mass mobilization in favor of the idea followed in the 
ESSR in 1988. 
However, merely mentioning a word does not lead to conceptual innovation. 
Just as any innovation (whether developing a service or a product) needs market 
potential, previous knowledge, teamwork, early adopters, and proposing a “new 
way of thinking,” the self-management project required all the same resources. 
One of them was a range of “economic experiments” in the 1970s and 1980s in 
the ESSR and its community of experts.  
 
 
2.4. Economic experiments in the ESSR 
The Estonian SSR was an exceptional republic in the Soviet Union, as it regularly 
experimented with market elements to improve economic management. Nikita 
Khrushchev’s Sovnarkhoz reform indirectly created the platform for this in 1957, 
by which the regional National Economy Councils (NEC) were launched in the 
Soviet Union. Even though NECs were canceled in 1965, the NEC period brought 
management training, consultation, and workers’ incentive practices to Estonian 
                                                                          
Sovetskaya Estoniya) could be seen as the creator of two semantic fields in the public space. 
From September 1987 onwards, the term as used in Estonian had strong national connotations, 
whereas in Russian it had practical and economic connotations. The term’s backward trans-
lation also became the common denominator of the project to introduce it in other republics. 
For instance, in September 1988, Ivar Raig published an article, “Respublika – na polnyi khoz-
raschet,” in the official newspaper of Azerbaijan’s Communist Party, Vyshka (Watchtower) 
(September 6, 1988). 
128  For alternative reform proposals made within the Party structures in East Central Europe 
in the mid-1980s (for instance, in Poland and Yugoslavia), see Trenscényi et. al. (2018), 30–34. 
129  There is an interesting overlap of presenting the proposals for democratizing economy by 
the Four-Man Proposal in the ESSR and by the Polish Solidarity movement in emigration, 
both in mid-1987. After martial law was imposed in Poland in 1981, the Solidarity movement 
continued locally in underground but also in exile committees in the diaspora. Their rhetoric 
underwent an important shift, focusing on economics and the market rather than the role of 
workers’ self-management in factories. It is remarkable that the rhetoric used by Solidarity in 
emigration was very much like the rhetoric that the Four-Man Proposal used in Soviet Estonia. 
In April 1987, the Solidarity committee in Brussels put forward a declaration demanding pro-
found “economic reforms, equality amongst the various forms of ownership, a return to market 
mechanisms and a clear democratisation of the economy.” For the economic declaration of 
the Solidarity committee in Brussels, see Miklós Mitrovits (2010), “From the Idea of Self-
Management to Capitalism: The Characteristics of the Polish Transformation Process,” Jour-
nal of Contemporary Central and Eastern Europe 18, no. 2: 163–184. 
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enterprises.130 From the early 1970s onwards, several methods for stimulating the 
economy were usually tested first in Estonia, before it was applied elsewhere in 
the Soviet Union (if indeed it ever was). Estonia gained a reputation as the 
“laboratory of economic experiments” for the union, whereas the actions in this 
laboratory were referred to in Soviet terms as “economic experiments for im-
proving the economic mechanism.”131 In 1974, the first territorial agroindustrial 
association (territoriaalne agrotööstuskoondis, ATK) in the Soviet Union was 
launched experimentally in Viljandi County (rajoon) in the southern ESSR, which 
was soon expanded to other ESSR counties (in 1979 to Pärnu and in 1981 to all 
others). In 1983, by a decision of the Soviet Union’s Council of Ministries, Esto-
nian ATKs were expanded on the republican level, and Eesti NSV Agrotööstus-
koondis (as the umbrella organization for local, regional ATKs) was launched.132 
According to the memoirs of its first director, Heino Veldi, the initial vision of 
the new organization was  
 
to create a territorial system consisting of different self-manageable blocs like agri-
cultural and construction enterprises, scientific think tanks for developing regional 
agriculture, foreign relations with other countries’ companies, etc.133  
 
                                                                          
130  Raoul Üksvärav (2000), “Eesti juhtimismõtte areng,” in Jäljed. Meenutusi täiskasvanu-
hariduse lähiajaloost Eestis (ed. Talvi Märja) (SE & JS), 109. 
131  In the early 1960s, there was an intellectual debate on how to decentralize and optimize the 
Soviet economy, most explicitly in the journal Novyi Mir. The central figure in this debate was 
the aforementioned Yevsei Lieberman, who opened the public discussion with the article 
“Plan, Profit, Bonus” in Pravda in September 1962, followed by the article “State and Market” 
in Novyi Mir (1963). That is why the debate has also been called the “Lieberman discussions.” 
Lieberman’s main proposal was to transfer decision-making power from the central govern-
ment to the managers and staff of enterprises, reducing the number of instructions imposed 
from above. Additionally, he emphasized the principle of khozraschet and the need for direct 
negotiations between enterprises and potential buyers (stores). The ESSR’s enterprises had a 
crucial task to fill this proposal. In 1965, two Estonian economists from the Institute of Eco-
nomics, Leonid Brutus and Ülo Ennuste, were interviewed by the French Communist Party 
journal Democratie Nouvelle. Brutus and Ennuste revealed plans for a large-scale “economic 
experiment” in the Estonian SSR based on Lieberman’s principles and theory of optimal 
planning, developed in the Central Economic Mathematical Institute (CEMI) by Nikolay 
Fedorenko. For that reason, the branch of the CEMI was launched in Tallinn in 1965, and Raul 
Renter (1920–1992) was appointed as its head. On the experiment’s planned content, see 
Leonid Brutus and Ülo Ennuste (1965), “Un domaine d’experimentation economique,” Demo-
cratie Nouvelle, March 1965, 89–94. In April 1988, Alari Purju introduced the 1965 experi-
ment plans in the Estonian media; see Alari Purju (1988), “Ühest majanduseksperimendi 
katsest,” Noorte Hääl, April 13, 1988. 
132  NLKP Keskkomitee ja NSVL Ministrite Nõukogu määrus nr. 151 ja ENSV Ülemnõukogu 
Presiidiumi seadus “Eesti NSV Agrotööstuskoondise moodustamise kohta” (approved 
February 17, 1983).  
133  Meelika Sander-Sõrmus (2018), “Endine põllumajandusjuht: uhke tunne oli kui toodang 
lehma kohta ületas 4000 piiri,” Põllumajandus.ee, November 14, 2018. 
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Although the local party elite did not support such a radical vision, according to 
Veldi, at least, in 1983 “the Estonian agricultural enterprises acquired the right to 
sell their products to foreign countries and to develop technology and equipment, 
on the condition that their obligations related to republican and all-union funds 
were fulfilled.”134  
Even though the experiments had to be confirmed first by the Council of 
Ministries, the experiments were not planned “from above.” By contrast, the ex-
periments from the 1970s to the mid-1980s grew out from the economists of the 
“marketeers” (rynochniki). However, they had to fight on several fronts for their 
experiments to be recognized, as the local organs were mostly uninterested and 
resisted the proposals. The architects of the Estonian economic experiments (Valter 
Udam and ATK; Juhan Sillaste and contractual units; Jüri Kraft in the Ministry 
of Light Industry) had to negotiate with officials simultaneously in Moscow and 
Tallinn, and often use their personal contacts in Moscow to push through their 
ideas.135 In all, these experiments were a distinctive feature in terms of innovation 
in the Estonian SSR's economy, differentiating it from other republics. 
There were successful and unsuccessful attempts to experiment with “self-
managerial relations” in the economy. For instance, the year 1982 saw an unsuc-
cessful effort to experiment with regional khozraschet on Saaremaa (Estonia’s 
largest island), proposed by two marketeers, Ivar Raig and Mikhail Bronshtein. 
The plan aimed to use Saaremaa as the incubation raion to test self-managerial 
relations in the economy.136 During the experimental phase, agriculture, services, 
and light industry on the island were supposed to be fully self-accounting.137 
Despite having the official support of the ESSR’s Academy of Sciences and 
Novosibirsk Institute of Industrial Economics, this proposal was eventually turned 
down by the ESSR’s Council of Ministries. 
Simultaneously, there was a preparation process for another experiment, which 
turned out to be successful. It was the “contractual work experiment” (lepingulise 
töö eksperiment), also known as a “service experiment” (teeninduseksperiment) 
in the ESSR’s custom services in 1985 (the focus of Study I). This particular 
experiment was initiated by Juhan Sillaste, who served as an Estonian official in 
Gosplan in Moscow (1982–1983) and as the head of the Institute of Services 
(Teenindusinstituut) in Tallinn. During his Gosplan tenure in late 1982, the new 
CPSU general secretary Yuri Andropov and Nikolai Ryzhkov (the head of the 
                                                                          
134  Ibid. 
135  For the importance of personal contacts in gaining the status of “experiment” for marketeers’ 
projects, see Juhan Sillaste (2009), Mineviku mustad kastid: Perestroika laborandi mälestused 
(Tallinn); and Mati Laos (2017), Jüri Kraft. Härra seltsimees minister (Maaleht), 198–199. 
136  Ivar Raig (2018), “Saaremaa eksperiment, IME agraarprogramm ja Rahvarinde maaelu 
edendamise töörühm,” in Eestimaa Rahvarinne 30, ed. Kostel Gerndorf (Rahvarinde Muuseum), 
158–159.  
137  Author’s interview with Ivar Raig (Tallinn, February 15, 2019). According to Raig, the 
island of Saaremaa (Kingissepa rajoon) was chosen for the experiment due to its status as a 
border zone in the ESSR, isolated from the mainland and therefore a suitable place for the 
incubatory method. 
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CPSU’s CC economic department) started to encourage research on the practices 
of other Soviet states.138 In February 1983, Politburo established a select working 
group to study COMECON countries’ economic experiences to use those practical 
elements in the Soviet Union.139 This group, headed by Gosplan chairman Nikolai 
Baibakov, was established to prepare proposals directly for the Politburo. Even-
tually, the expert group’s leading members (Juhan Sillaste and Tatiana Koriagina) 
worked out the experiment’s memorandum. It proved to be an essential step in 
the process that culminated with the contractual work experiment’s approval in 
early 1985. The changes in the legislation related to the service experiment paved 
the way for the next experiment with “service cooperatives” (which the ESSR 
was also the first in the Soviet Union to try) in early 1987.140 Eventually, the 
experiment’s legislation became a blueprint for testing the cooperatives in all 
spheres, something that was officially permitted by the USSR’s Ministry of 
Councils on May 26, 1988.141 
In all, the conclusive principle for these actions was experimenting with the 
market-socialist element within the planned economy system. According to Esto-
nian scholar Erik Terk, we should not interpret the period of economic experi-
ments in the ESSR as a “pre-stage” for later economic reforms. While Terk admits 
that, for instance, “the contractual work experiment in services relates more than 
others to the market economy logic,” in his words, most of them were only “local 
actions under the conditions of a command economy.”142 However, the disser-
tation argues that besides evaluating these experiments by the market economy 
system’s standards, we can also see these experiments as “institutional resources” 
to expand self-managerial relations later in 1987. 
Most of the architects of these previous experiments were involved with the 
IME project in 1988. They were among the authors behind the IME conception 
(including Ivi Proos, Ivar Raig, and Mikhail Bronshtein) or worked on the con-
cept of ESSR’s self-management in the ESSR’s Economic Institute in Academy 
                                                                          
138  Robert D. English (2000, 173) remarks that “He [Andropov] sponsored several economic 
innovations – ‘experiments’ in enterprise autonomy and decentralized management… 
Although in hindsight these can be seen as inadequate half-measures, they were reasonably 
bold in the climate and context of 1983. Moreover, they were linked to what would be 
Andropov’s most lasting contribution – the beginning of the political-personnel changes that 
would later facilitate the inception of perestroika.”  
139  COMECON is an acronym for the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (in Russian, 
Sovet Ekonomicheskoi Vzaimopomoshchi). It was an economic organization from 1949 to 
1991 led by the Soviet Union; it included the countries of the Eastern bloc, along with a 
number of socialist states elsewhere in the world but did not include Yugoslavia or China. 
140  Sillaste (2009), 110. 
141  NSVL Ülemnõukogu (1989), Nõukogude Sotsialistlike Vabariikide Liidu seadus koope-
ratsioonist NSV Liidus (Tallinn: Olion), 6. 
142  See Terk (2016), 13. 
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of Sciences (ENSV TA Majandusinstituut), like Rein Otsason.143 According to 
Rein Otsason, 
 
the economic school that took shape in Estonia well before perestroika revo-
lutionized Soviet economics as a whole. And we should not think about that 
separately from Estonian independence. On the contrary: only thanks to the fact 
that we had this free-thinking school of economists was it possible to be the first 
among the Soviet republics to work out the concept of economic independence. 
When we formed the working group of self-management in the Economic Institute 
in 1988, I recruited the people related to the economic experiments.144 
 
The marketeers not only proposed the experiments but were also connected with 
the ESSR’s experts on management practices. We can outline two main hubs for 
experimental management practices from the early 1970s. These were the mana-
gement school in Tallinn’s Polytechnical Institute (TPI) and the Tallinn-based 
innovation center Mainor (launched under the Ministry of Light Industry’s juris-
diction). It was a training institute for managers for market research and a consul-
tancy bureau for enterprises. The bureau was renamed “Mainor” in 1982.145 The 
experts at Mainor worked out several proposals for new experiments, including 
the “self-manageable complex in light industry” (isemajandav tööstuskoondis 
kergetööstuses) in 1975.146 This experiment aimed to create an economically 
                                                                          
143  While Savisaar was the leader of Mainor’s expert group, Otsason was the head of the Eco-
nomic Institute’s expert group; these groups clashed over how to verbalize the official project 
of “self-management” and present it to the ESSR’s Council of Ministries. They had different 
views on how to proceed with the republic’s financial independence and the currency reform 
in 1988–1990. Whereas Savisaar supported the idea of a “convertible ruble” (koru), Otsason 
pushed for a national currency (Eesti kroon). 
144  Mart Laar, Urmas Ott, and Sirje Endre (1996), Teine Eesti. Eeslava. Eesti iseseisvuse taas-
sünd 1986 – 1991. Intervjuud, dokumendid, kõned, artiklid, 226. Alexandr Yakovlev similarly 
said in an interview that “the ideas of perestroika were nourished in different fields for a long 
time, even too long… these ideas have been developed over the years by scholars, cultural 
figures, and people engaged in political activity… this explains the rapid acceptance of the 
ideas of perestroika and its overall strategy – not simply acceptance but the active support of 
the people.” Stephen F. Cohen and Katrina Vanden Heuvel (1989), Voices of Glasnost: Inter-
views with Gorbachev’s Reformers (W. W. Norton & Company), 41–42. 
145  The name “Mainor” is an acronym formed from Estonian words: MA from majandus (eco-
nomy), IN from inimene / informatsioon (person / information), and OR from organisatsioon 
(organization). Mainor’s leadership stretches back to Raoul Üksvärav and Hillar Kala (the first 
director from 1971). It had two transnational aspects: first, the adoption and then application 
of American management theory (as a majority of Mainor’s leaders stemmed from Üksvärav’s 
school) and studying Finnish practices since the mid-1970s. In Finland, Mainor had good 
relations with Finnish consulting bureau MEC-RASTOR. In the late 1970s, Mainor become a 
training center in the Soviet Union for market consultancy and also had cooperation with US 
management scholars. Mati Laos (2014), Mainori lugu (Tallinn: AS Mainor).  
146  Hillar Kala (2014), “Mainori rollidest Eesti majandus- ja ühiskonnaelus,” in Mainori lugu 
(Tallinn: AS Mainor), 546. 
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independent management unit for about 130 Estonian enterprises.147 The experi-
ment became Mainor’s platform for extending light industry’s self-manageable 
relations, which continued into the mid-1980s. In late 1987, when Edgar Savisaar 
was sacked from the Planning Committee (for publishing the Four-Man Proposal 
in the media), Mainor’s director Ülo Pärnits hired him as the new head of the 
Mainor’s science department.148 Savisaar’s new cabinet in Mainor instantly 
became the headquarters for the IME movement. 
The author’s interviews with the economists in the IME movement reveal that 
some of them initially perceived “territorial self-management” as an “experimental 
project to use the microeconomic model in a macroeconomic environment” (Ivi 
Proos),149 but also as “the evolutionary outcome of the previous experiments that 
grew more radical through the years” (Ivar Raig).150 In Proos’s words, “national 
independence was not what we wanted to achieve with the proposal… in the 
beginning, it was just an idea for a new economic experiment – let us try to control 
the Estonian national economy and budget all by ourselves, as our best kolkhozes 
did.”151 Similarly, the references to isemajandamine as a “model” and “experi-
ment” in late 1987 and early 1988 were frequently made by other economists.152 
The protocols of the first meeting of the expert group in the Plan Committee in 
August 1987 asserted that “the meeting aims to work out an economic model for 
territorial self-management.”153 In April 1988, at the IME Forum, Marju Lauristin 
suggested that “our idea of a self-managing republic can become a blueprint for 
other republics in the Soviet Union to follow.”154 
However, this blueprint “model,” which was initially related to territorial eco-
nomic independence, eventually came to be viewed as a “model of democracy.” 
                                                                          
147  Ibid. 
148  Laos (2004), 210–211. 
149  Author’s interview with Ivi Proos (Tallinn, February 3, 2015). 
150  Author’s interview with Ivar Raig (Tallinn, February 15, 2019). 
151  Author’s interview with Ivi Proos (Tallinn, February 3, 2015). 
152  Arvo Sirendi, Estonian agricultural scientist, said in December 1987 that “as other regions 
in the Soviet Union would not move towards ‘republican self-management’ in the near future, 
we have to apply for the experiment status to this idea – it is inescapable for its implemen-
tation” (December 8, 1987, Ühistöö). Meanwhile, one of the signatories of the Four-Man Pro-
posal, Mikk Titma, wrote that “the consent from the center for this economic experiment 
would mean great trust in our project”: see Mikk Titma (1987) “Isemajandamise sotsiaalne 
kontekst,” Noorte Hääl, December 16, 1987. The conceptualization of the project as an 
“experiment” continued in early 1988, as the head of the ESSR’s Academy of Sciences, Arno 
Köörna, said in a speech in the Plenum of Creative Unions in April 1, 1988, that economists 
were working “on the theoretical and practical basis of the experiment of republican self-
management.” Eesti NSV Loominguliste Liitude Juhatuste Ühispleenum (1988) (Tallinn: Eesti 
Raamat), 35. 
153  “Eesti NSV täieliku isemajandamise kontseptsioon. Eesti NSV Plaanikomitee töögrupi 
liikmete mõttevahetuse koondseisukohtade protokoll,” August 18, 1987 (in author’s 
possession). 
154  Marju Lauristin (1988), “Isemajandamisfoorum Tartus” [Forum of Economic Self-
Management in Tartu], Edasi, April 29, 1988. 
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In early 1989, Ivi Proos described the IME project as a part of “deepening demo-
cracy on the etalon principle” by which “several movements based on the initia-
tive from below have created the islands of democracy, which altogether function 
as a democratically operating relational system, which in turn, as a mechanism, 
reproduces democracy (demokraatiat reaalselt taastootev mehhanism).”155 In 
Proos’s words, “this democracy may still be too much “singing,” but it exists as 
a mechanism, and therefore we now have channels through which the will of the 
majority can influence the processes in society.”156  
We can draw several conclusions here. First, “experiment” was an economic-
legal category institutionalized in economics. Innovations were possible only by 
acquiring the status of “experiment” through Soviet legislation. Therefore, we 
can see it as an “institutional resource” for the marketeers. Second, “experiment” 
was a model to follow – to expand self-managerial relations in the economy and 
politics. In this way, “experiment” has a family resemblance to the concepts 
mentioned above (“critique,” “improvement,” and “plan”), enabling changes to 
be made in the system.157 Third, the history of experimentation in the ESSR 
provided cumulative practical knowledge for the Estonian economists, which 
they were able to use in the IME movement (Otsason’s argument). Fourth, at the 
most abstract level, it developed the form of argumentation that we can call “the 
language of innovation,” described in more detail in Chapter 2.6. Before doing 
that, we look at the adoption of the global scientific discourse in the ESSR before 
perestroika and its impact on the Estonian authors.  
 
 
2.5. Global scientific discourse and the ESSR 
Next, I will point out three global disciplines that had an impact on economic 
circles and innovational thought in the ESSR: these were management theory, 
system approach, and global- and future studies. I will start from the 1960s and 
finish with the perestroika period. 
On a global scale, the period 1965–1975 was a phase of relaxation (détente) 
between the Cold War counterparts. Aside from the détente in foreign relations, 
cooperation increased between the scientists on both sides. It also impacted the 
adoption of US management theory in the Estonian SSR. After the Cuban missile 
crisis, in 1963, through the scientists’ exchange program between the United 
States and the Soviet Union, a young Estonian economist, Raoul Üksvärav 
(1928–2016), had a unique chance to study management theory in the United 
                                                                          
155  Ivi Proos (1989), IME koolituskursuse konspekt. Isemajandav Eesti – radikaalse majandus-
reformi variant. I osa. (Eesti Majandusjuhtide Instituut), 24. 
156  Ibid. 
157  In the Soviet system, the “experiment” as a concept was meant to be only a test to stimulate 
the planned economy, often seen as a temporary action, and was not supposed to undermine 
or break the system itself. For a deeper metaphorical meaning of the “experiment” in 
perestroika ideology, see Marina Kaul (1998), 105. 
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States. In 1963–1964, Üksvärav spent most of the year at the University of Cali-
fornia, Berkeley, but visited many US management scholars (including Douglas 
McGregor, Edgar Schein, and Harold Koontz) in several other universities as well 
(e.g., in MIT and Harvard).158 Back in Tallinn, Üksvärav started lecturing in 1966 
at the TPI (Tallinna Polütehniline Instituut) on management and system approach 
in organizational theory, becoming the management guru for the TPI students.159 
The concepts and methods borrowed from US management theory (leadership, 
management consultation, gaming, self-regulation, etc.) were adopted into local 
managerial studies. They formed a conceptual infrastructure for the scholars in 
the ESSR.160 “Üksvärav’s school” consisted of many management experts and 
economists (working at TPI and Mainor) who were later members of the IME 
movement and the Estonian Popular Front (such as Kostel Gerndorf, Erik Terk, 
and Peeter Kross).  
From 1975 onwards, the TPI managerial school held conferences on manage-
ment theory and practice, which attracted participants from all Soviet republics. 
Two of Üksvärav’s students, Erik Terk and Tiit Elenurm, focused in the late 
1970s and early 1980s on lecturing on consulting methods in innovatics (inno-
vaatika), like the innovation game (innovaatiline mäng) for testing new employ-
ment forms, services, or products.161 In his book Leader – Innovation – Orga-
nization, published in 1986, Elenurm stressed the need for the constant innovation 
of “self-managerial” relations in economic management, bringing the case of 
“brigade work” (as a new employment form) as a positive example. Elenurm 
emphasized the importance of an enterprise’s “independence” in innovation 
processes (uuendusprotsessid), including its capacity for “diagnosing” the “inno-
vation potential” in the organization.162  
Aside from management theory, the cybernetics and system approach heavily 
influenced the Estonian sociologists at the University of Tartu. In the ESSR, 
history and economics were placed under the highest ideological control, whereas 
                                                                          
158  Raoul Üksvärav (2000), 101. 
159  In 1967, Üksvärav defended his doctoral dissertation, entitled “Majandusorganisat-
sioonide ülesehituse ja juhtimise probleeme Ameerika Ühendriikides” (The Problems of 
Structure and Management of Economic Organizations in the United States). Üksvärav’s 
official approach was a “critique” of the Western systems. However, his lectures were based 
mainly on the personal experience and literature he acquired from the United States. 
160  For more on the adaptation of Western management theories in the ESSR in the 1960s and 
1970s, see Martin Klesment (2009), “Interpretation and Adjustment of Foreign Concepts in 
Soviet Estonia: The Discussion and Adaptation of Management Theories,” European Review 
of History – Revue européenne d’histoire 16, no. 1: 151–167. 
161  Erik Terk (1981), Analüüsi ja konsulteerimise meetodid uute toodete väljatöötamisel ja 
juurutamisel ettevõtetes. VI majandusorganisatsioonide juhtimise probleemide konverents 
(Tallinn: TPI); Tiit Elenurm (1985), Innovaatiline mäng juhtimisalase konsultatsioonitegevuse 
vahendina. VII majandusorganisatsioonide juhtimise probleemide konverents “Juhtimise 
konsulteerimise teooria ja praktika” (Tallinn: TPI). 
162  Tiit Elenurm (1986), Juht – uuendused – organisatsioon (Tallinn: Valgus), 55–70. 
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natural and social sciences received the least such control.163 Therefore, socio-
logists’ “language” was richer and more international than, for example, that of 
the local historians.164 Social and natural sciences were much more combined – 
physics, philosophy, cybernetics, and social system modeling were often taught 
by the same individuals (e.g., Lembit Valt in Tartu).165 In the 1960s, this created 
a generational division among the scientists, experts, and state officials. Marju 
Lauristin stresses the educational convergence in different social strata in the 
1960s: 
 
Yes, we used system theory concepts, like feedback, input, or self-regulation, but 
we also did not have another language to speak. It was paradigmatic for social 
scientists at that time but actually for our officials too… and it did not start with 
perestroika. It existed as far back as the 1960s. It just became visible when it 
appeared under Brezhnev’s mud.166  
 
However, this shared language between the scientists and reform-minded 
nomenklatura did become politically significant right after perestroika began in 
1985. In the Estonian public press, the debate over more humanistic and decent-
ralized politics began precisely by placing the system approach and its concepts 
into the early discussion on politics in 1986.167 Lauristin explains the further con-
sequences of this pattern: 
 
Why did the IME movement happen in 1987–1988 in Estonia and not in Russia? 
Why did it mobilize so many people? Because we had a considerable number of 
scientists and executive officials trained by the same management school who 
                                                                          
163  Peeter Vihalemm (2001), “Development of Media Research in Estonia,” Nordic Research 
on Media and Communication 22, no. 2. 
164  There were a series of seminars in the second half of the 1960s in Kääriku, organized by 
sociologists from the University of Tartu (including Ülo Vooglaid, Marju Lauristin, and Peeter 
Vihalemm) that attracted colleagues from all over the Soviet Union. The topics of the dis-
cussions included not only theoretical approaches from Soviet scholars (e.g. Vladimir Yadov) 
but also global sociological thought (Robert Merton, Talcott Parsons, Kingsley Davis, etc.), 
as many texts by Western scholars were translated into Russian and printed for participants in 
advance. Marju Lauristin recalls that “when I attended international conferences, I did not have 
any problems getting orientated in global sociological theories… the journal Sociology Today, 
which introduced all the mainstream Western theories, had been regularly translated into Rus-
sian since 1965”: Author's interview with Marju Lauristin (Tartu, November 29, 2018). 
165  One of the concepts from sociological cybernetics as a hybrid form of social and natural 
sciences – “self-regulation” – was later successfully incorporated into the self-management 
discourse by the Tartu Group of Self-Management; see Study II. 
166  Author’s interview with Marju Lauristin (Tartu, November 29, 2018). 
167  Edgar Savisaar used system-theory vocabulary throughout his early essay “Võitlus mõtte-
viisi pärast” (“The Battle for the Way of Thinking”), written in 1986, published in the pro-
perestroika magazine Vikerkaar. His critique targeted “centralism,” using system-theory argu-
ments to push for decentralization in economic and social life. Savisaar admitted in the essay 
that “the reader has certainly noticed that I’m following a system-analytic approach to a 
society”; see Savisaar (1987), “Võitlus mõtteviisi pärast,” Vikerkaar 2, 56. 
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therefore spoke the same language – they had gained the same education in the 
same universities, under the same professors, and were interested in the IME’s 
implementation.168  
 
Yet it was not only system approach and management theory that connected the 
scientific community with the economic and power elite. In the context of the Cold 
War, the governments of opposing states promoted several new methods and 
disciplines. Some of them were initially related to large state projects, such as 
developing the Delphi and scenario method in the United States or computer 
science in the USSR.169 In 1972, cooperation was established between American 
and Soviet scholars on a computer modeling and systems approach.170 At the 
same time, due to the increasing concern about global problems (such as famines, 
increasing population growth, and the nuclear threat), another new field emerged 
in science in the early 1970s: “global studies” (globaaluuringud). One of the 
features of global studies was to present alternative “future scenarios” (as global 
models) to these problems. In the ESSR, the first scholar to join the Soviet scien-
tific community of global studies was Lembit Valt (1934–2008), a physics and 
science philosophy professor at the University of Tartu in 1957–1970. One of 
Valt’s students, Edgar Savisaar, approached global studies by examining the Club 
of Rome’s role. In 1980, Savisaar graduated from the University of Moscow with 
a dissertation on global models’ social and philosophical roots in the Club of Rome. 
In 1982, Savisaar wrote a book with Valt on global studies that was published in 
Estonia in 1983.171  
                                                                          
168  Author’s interview with Marju Lauristin (Tartu, November 29, 2018). From the interviews 
and public texts, we can suggest that this linguistic convergence between the scientists, offi-
cials, experts, and even party intelligentsia was also the main difference from the dissident 
discourse. For instance, a member of Russian dissident circles in the 1970s, Gleb Pavlovski, 
recalls that “during the late 1970s, we lacked an appropriate language to describe politics… 
in contrast to the term ‘ethical,’ the term ‘political’ was suspicious in the dissident move-
ment… in the end, the moralistic project of human rights turned out to be politically weak and 
sterile”; see “Tatjana Žurženko ja Ivan Krastevi intervjuu Gleb Pavlovskiga” (2011), Viker-
kaar, no. 6. Thus, the availability of the system-theory language, shared by scientists and state 
experts, was one reason why the conceptualization for the new decentralist politics started 
among the social scientists and not among the extra-structural dissent. 
169  For a recent study on the connection between the rise of the future studies (including the 
scenario method) and US defense politics, see Christian Dayé (2020), Experts, Social Scientists, 
and Techniques of Prognosis in Cold War America (Palgrave Macmillan). On developing a 
nationwide computer network in the Soviet Union, see Benjamin Peters (2016), How Not to 
Network a Nation: The Uneasy History of the Soviet Internet (MIT Press). 
170  Egle Rindzevičiūtė (2016). Rindzevičiūtė shows the global rise of the system approach 
during the Cold War period, focusing on the role of the IIASA (International Institute of Applied 
Systems Analysis). The institute was a meeting point for US and Soviet scholars, established 
in 1972, located in Laxenburg, Austria. The IIASA’s main task was to apply systems analysis 
to the research on global problems, mobilizing scholars from various countries. One of the 
Estonian representatives in IIASA was Erik Terk. 
171  Lembit Valt and Edgar Savisaar (1983), Globaalprobleemid ja tulevikustsenaariumid 
(Eesti Raamat).  
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Study III shows how, through their book and Savisaar’s early essays (but also 
due to his personal career change), a new term – “future scenario”– migrated in 
1985–1986 from the global studies discourse to the ESSR’s mainstream press. 
More importantly, it changed the language of political decision-making. Namely, 
in 1985, Savisaar was nominated to serve as the head of a department in the 
Estonian Planning Committee, the highest economic planning institution in the 
ESSR (the local branch of the Soviet Gosplan). The department started to work 
on “development scenarios” for the ESSR’s economic sectors. In May 1987, a 
public contest of “economic development scenarios” was announced by Savisaar’s 
department. Although the “scenario method” was already known by the local 
management school since the 1970s, the contest for “future scenarios” was the 
first of its kind in Estonia.172 Study III shows in more detail why I consider this a 
conceptual move in Skinnerian terms. Using the progressive scientific speak, 
Savisaar implemented an alternative language to hijack the “future” from the 
hands of the Communist Party, to make the debate on the ESSR’s “alternative 
futures” public. The concept, which was borrowed from the scientific reports on 
global problems submitted to the Club of Rome, was eventually put into practice 
to work out the project of “territorial self-management.”173 
The other development by which Estonian authors manipulated the global 
science discourse was combining a system-theory approach directly with territorial 
self-management and confederal sovereignty. Study III looks at the “theory of 
self-management,” elaborated by Estonian economist Uno Mereste in 1988.174 
Mereste was a long-time admirer of the system approach and combined it with 
                                                                          
172  In 1991, Edgar Savisaar initiated the Estonian Future Congress (Eesti Tuleviku Kongress), 
which could be seen as a continuation of the first scenario contest, held in May 1987. The head 
of the congress was Lembit Valt, and the international visitors included the then-leader of the 
Club of Rome, Alexander King. A year later, in 1992, Erik Terk founded the Institute of Future 
Studies in Tallinn. See Erik Terk (2014), Eestist ja ettepoole (Tallinna Ülikool), 150–151. 
173  The term “global” had a somewhat controversial status in the Soviet Union until late pere-
stroika. Publicly, it was strongly charged with negative connotations, as “globalism” was related 
to US world hegemony. At the same time it was used completely differently by Soviet scholars, 
who were focused on computer modeling, including by Lembit Valt in the 1970s in Tallinn 
and in VNIISI (Soviet Institute of Systems Research in Moscow, which was a partner of 
IIASA). As Rindzevičiūtė (2016) suggests, it was exactly from computer modeling that the 
geophysical (and not ideological) notion of “global” migrated to Soviet economists’ texts on 
world economics, and then later on to political discourse (132). Eventually, it reached the 
highest political level in the Soviet Union in 1985, when the notion of “global problems” was 
used for the first time in CPSU congress documents (ibid.). According to Andrei Grachev 
(Gorbachev’s personal adviser), Gorbachev himself related to a considerable degree with the 
ideas discussed by the Club of Rome, as well as with the Pugwash Conferences on global 
problems. See Andrei Grachev (2015), “Gorbachev and the New Political Thinking,” in The 
Revolutions of 1989: A Handbook, ed. Mueller, Gehler, and Suppan (Vienna: ÖAV), 33.  
174  Uno Mereste (1989), Mis on ISE-majandamine? Isemajandamisteooria alused (Eesti 
Raamat). 
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economics and linguistics in his previous work.175 In 1988, Mereste made a 
system-theory argument that we should consider the sovereign status of the ESSR 
as an “emergent result” of the economic system, connecting it with the Hayekian 
idea of a self-governing economy (see Study III).176  
Alongside economics, the science of self-governing systems was combined in 
the ESSR with the philosophy of science. It was most often related to Ilya 
Prigogine and his Nobel Prize-winning theory of “open systems” and “self-orga-
nization.”177 For instance, the circle of science philosophers (including Meelik 
Kattago) argued in 1988 that “territorial self-management” is natural in a socialist 
system, as based on Prigogine’s theory, the state as a system has reached the point 
of bifurcation, where the system’s force of self-organization opens several paths 
for further development (see more in Study III).178  
There were two think tanks in the IME movement; both established in January 
1988: the IME Council (IME Probleemnõukogu) for scientists and the IME 
Forum (IME Foorum) for journalists. Both valued the scientific community’s 
connections highly in the Soviet Union and the Soviet mainstream and scientific 
press. Networking with the Soviet institutes and newspapers as potential allies 
for promoting the project was the IME Council’s intentional strategy. Below is a 
chart from summer 1988, drawn by the members in the IME Council, which 
diagrammed existing connections with the council’s partners in the Soviet Union 
and elsewhere: 
 
                                                                          
175  Uno Mereste (1985), “Süsteemiteoreetilisi mõlgutusi üld-, ühis- ja teaduskeele vahe-
korrast,” Keel ja Kirjandus 6, 335–342. 
176  Trencsényi et al. point out that Polish dissidents in the 1970s somewhat controversially 
connected economic liberalism with theorists with very diverse philosophical premises (e.g., 
Hayekian and Popperian criticism of Marxism with Arendt’s approach to totalitarianism), as 
all of them could be used together in an anticommunist agenda: see Trencsényi et al. (2018), 
154. In 1988 in the ESSR, Uno Mereste also used Hayekian critique on the socialist command 
economy (though not by name): see Study III. Ten years later, in 1998, Mereste wrote a review 
essay for Friedrich Hayek’s book The Fatal Conceit: The Errors of Socialism (translated into 
Estonian in 1997). The review strongly supported Hayek’s ideas, describing the relations 
between market, objectivity, and system approach. See Uno Mereste (1998), “Majanduslik 
tegelikkus,” Akadeemia 6, 1170–1193. 
177  Ilya Prigogine (1977), Self-Organization in Non-Equilibrium Systems (Wiley). 
178  Meelik Kattago (1988), “Traktaat iseliikumise allikast. Tasatuse kontseptsioon,” Viker-
kaar, nos. 1–6. 
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The chart of the IME Council’s and the IME Forum’s partners in the Soviet Union (1988). 
In the bottom left-hand corner are the connections drawn with partners from other states – 
Finland (Soome), Hungary (Ungari), and Poland (Poola). Source: Ivar Raig’s private 
collection. 
 
Another critical aspect has to be taken into account (as it explains the IME move-
ment’s success), which was scientists’ and experts’ competence in communica-
tion skills within the power elite. At the ESSR’s Creative Unions plenum speech 
in April 1988, sociologist Aili Aarelaid observed the strategic “skills” of this 
generation: 
 
The leaders of this renaissance (uusärkamine) are the so-called Sixties generation, 
to whom it is the last (and thus very seriously taken) chance to fulfill the ideals of 
their youth on the nation’s mission and democracy. Thanks to their political and 
professional maturity – as there are many philosophers, sociologists, historians, 
and economists – they realize the dangers that threaten Estonia and its national 
existence. This generation has years of combat experience in bureaucratic labyrinths 
that has equipped them (for this very moment) with such valuable skills – to use 
pressure tactics, to balance on the red line, to dictate the people’s will to authorities 
in the language understandable to them, to sense the strategic backbone.179 
                                                                          
179  Aili Aarelaid (1998), “Eksperdina loomeliitude ühispleenumil,” in Ikka kultuurist mõteldes 
(Tallinn: Virgela), 12. These communication skills and cultivation of scientific language also 
had their drawbacks. According to Peeter Vihalemm, the Estonian Popular Front’s “use of 
vocabulary” was one of the reasons why the Estonian youth movement (Noortefoorum) 
distanced itself from them. According to Vihalemm, “it was because of the coldness and 
technicality of the Popular Front’s language” (author’s interview with Peeter Vihalemm, 2020). 
 
57 
All in all, the global scientific discourse and the personal networks were harnessed 
by the ESSR’s social and natural scientists to support the self-management pro-
posal. Yet the system approach, scenario method, management theory, and science 
philosophy amounted to more than just intellectual resources for the scientific 
legitimation of the “self-management” project. I suggest that they were also part 
of the structural languages through which these claims could be further theorized 
and expanded.  
 
 
2.6. The languages of Estonian perestroika 
Following the Cambridge School, the dissertation’s theoretical premise is that 
authors’ conceptual moves in texts rely on, and develop, pre-existing languages. 
For example, one can deploy legal, economic, federal, or republican language to 
argue for one’s political aims. I suggest that we can also distinguish “decentralist,” 
“system theory,” and the language of “innovation” as further examples of argu-
mentative languages. While the two formerly mentioned languages have been 
illustrated above (mostly analyzed in Studies I and II), here I will elaborate on 
the features of the third one only.  
The most characteristic feature of the language of (open) innovation is that it 
unlocks the discussion; it promotes a “new way of thinking” to search for unusual 
solutions; it facilitates brainstorming; it proposes a dialogue between scientists 
and decision-makers; it values feedback from the public; and last, it admits that 
there can be unexpected results that contrast with the initial phase.180 I argue that 
this language was fundamentally different from previous regionalist economic 
thought in the Soviet Union.181 To regionalists, experimenting with regional 
                                                                          
180  In innovation theory, there is a distinction between the concepts “closed innovation” and 
“open innovation.” While the former refers to innovation that is developed inclusively by the 
entrepreneur, through internal resources, often hidden from the public, the latter refers to the 
open character of the innovation process, using multiple external resources (including feed-
back from the public) to drive the innovation. See more in H. Chesbrough and M. Bogers 
(2014), “Explicating Open Innovation: Clarifying an Emerging paradigm for Understanding 
Innovation,” in New Frontiers in Open Innovation, ed. H. Chesbrough, W. Vanhaverbeke, and 
J. West (Oxford University Press). 
181  In the Soviet Union, “regional economic thought” (regionaalne majandusmõte) was con-
ducted mostly by the economists at the Novosibirsk Institute of Industrial Economics (IEiOPP), 
which cooperated with the US school of “location theory” from the mid-1970s. Its aim was to 
elaborate upon research (including mathematical modeling) for the more productive manage-
ment of specific regions (oblast, krai, raion) in the Soviet Union, focusing on the characteris-
tics and resources of the region. There was a series of joint seminars with scholars from the 
US and the USSR in Tallinn as early as the late 1970s: see Riina Lõhmus (1986), “Nõukogude-
Ameerika majandusteadlaste ühisseminar Tallinnas,” Aja Pulss 4, 14–15. For instance, at a 
Tallinn seminar on regional economic thought in 1986, the visiting scholars from the US were 
prominent regional economists like Karen Polenske (MIT), Gerald Karaska, David Boyce, and 
others. Abel Aganbegyan and Rein Otsason (as the organizers of the Tallinn seminar) were 
both involved with planning the regional economic reforms of the Soviet Union: ibid. 
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khozraschet was relatively limited in scope both territorially and substantially, as 
it was often imagined through the Chinese model of a “closed economic zone.”182 
This model was also developed further by several economists in Estonia.183 Yet 
there was one fundamental difference. There were multiple articles in the central 
press and scientific journals on regional reforms by Soviet economists, but none 
of them was meant to be discussed publicly. None of the drafts was supposed to 
stay in the incubation period and inspire public debate. It was a crucial difference 
between other reform drafts and the IM proposal. To use today’s terminology, in 
September 1987, the IM proposal launched a start-up platform for alternative 
ideas. The proposal recommended to “release the republic’s human and scientific 
potential” to “open the discussion” on how to work out the republic’s economic 
independence.184 Erik Terk (futurologist, Edgar Savisaar’s adviser in 1987, and a 
member of the IME Council in 1988) recalls in his interview with the author: 
 
The “free economic zone” that the Soviet economists proposed would have meant 
a minimal and restricted area, such as Muuga Port near Tallinn. The self-
management proposal undoubtedly promoted a much greater plan and did not stay 
within the limits of economic reforms. It balanced between the economy and 
politics and was intentionally left open to testing the possibility to expand the rights 
of the republic. In future studies, we call it “strategic anchoring” – moving forward 
step by step, continually mapping out the alternatives.185 
 
Thus, although “regional economic thought” in the Soviet Union theorized similar 
topics (like creating territorial economic units in line with free-market principles), 
proposing this model for a Soviet republic as a whole was unprecedented, and 
according to Erik Terk, “a highly heretical move,” even in the regionalists’ camp. 
Below is a table that systematizes the grammar of those three languages – its 
arguments, actions, concepts, and metaphors.
                                                                          
182  For the observations and theoretical attempts of Soviet economists (such as A. Iziumov 
and S. Manezhev) to integrate the Chinese model into the Soviet system in the 1980s, see the 
recent study by Chris Miller (2016), The Struggle to Save the Soviet Economy: Mikhail 
Gorbachev and the Collapse of the USSR (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press), 
101–119. 
183  Arno Köörna (1988), “Hiina ime ja Eesti IME,” Edasi, October 6, 1988. On Köörna’s 
proposal to make the ESSR the first “closed economic zone” in the USSR, see Study II. Along-
side Köörna’s proposal, there was also the so-called “Three-Man Proposal” in December 1987, 
which proposed to place the city of Pärnu and Pärnu county (raion) in the ESSR on a “full 
self-accounting” basis. Ivar Raig, Sulev Mäeltsemees, and Raivo Rajamäe (1987), “Ettepanek: 
viia üks rajoon isemajandamisele,” Noorte Hääl, December 16, 1987.   
184  Kallas et al. (1987). 
185  Author’s correspondence with Erik Terk (January 2021). Even in December 1989, the IME 
Council announced in a statement that “no one, including the ECP and the ESSR government, 
can monopolize IME. If there are different visions of IME, then they should be analyzed 
publicly… The IME Council was formed through an initiative from below, and the public IME 
forums showed that the reform idea has wide public support.” “IME Probleemnõukogu 
avaldus,” Noorte Hääl, December 28, 1989. 
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Table 1. The languages of Estonian perestroika 
Lan-
guages  
Decentralism System theory  (Open) Innovation 











t The relations in the economy 
and politics should be based 
on decentralization, 
horizontal contractuality, and 
initiative from below 
Society is a system and 
works through self-
regulation and feedback 
We should open the stage 
for experiments and 









economics and management 
Scientification of reforms Experimentation  
De-ideologization of the 
future  




Colonization of the future 
Strategic anchoring 
Horizontal contractualization 
of economy and politics 
Biologization of economy 
 
Gamification Futurization 


































 Direct relations 
Horizontality vs. verticality 
Bottom-up vs. top-down 
Sovereignty expansion 
From below 
Economic units as cells 
Spontaneous order 
 
Innovation game  
Laboratory 
Incubator 




The dissertation develops a novel methodological approach to studying revo-
lutionary processes, highlighting the value of exploring the dynamics of con-
ceptual change in pre-revolutionary transformative moments. It focuses on the 
case of the Estonian SSR in the early and mid-perestroika period (1985–1988). 
This period – immediately preceding the “Singing Revolution” in Estonia – wit-
nessed substantial new developments in public discussion and political thought. 
The dissertation analyzes the changes that took place in the reform socialist dis-
course in this period, tracing their links to those in broader Soviet, but also in 
global discourses since the 1960s. At the same time, it also highlights the uni-
queness of the Estonian case, exploring the contextual resources that made pos-
sible the conceptual innovation that took place there. The conceptual innovation 
in Estonia led to the first revolutionary situation (the situation of “dual power”) 
among the 1989 revolutions in Europe, thus contributing to the collapse of the 
Soviet Union in 1991. Dissecting the dynamics of these changes, the study deepens 
our understanding of these broader processes and hopefully will serve as an 
inspiration for future studies on parallel or related processes elsewhere. 
 
The dissertation’s first thesis is that we can identify specific conceptual pro-
cesses in pre-revolutionary periods through which specific and technical con-
cepts, derived from an expert-language framework, acquire broader resonance 
and meaning in society, thus contributing to the rise of a revolutionary situation. 
The analytical term “conceptual innovation” that the study has introduced desig-
nates the conceptual process through which the meaning of a term is radically 
altered, so that it can eventually serve as a conceptual platform for new political 
claims. An example of this kind of innovation is the case of “self-management” 
(isemajandamine, IM) in September 1987. Alongside “conceptual innovation,” 
the dissertation also analyzes a further set of processes – how a concept can make 
space for other concepts; how a concept can be used as an action model; how some 
concepts in late totalitarianism (e.g., “experiment,” “critique,” or “plan”) served 
conflicting purposes (which I call “conceptual amphibiousness”); and how a con-
cept can be transferred from one disciplinary domain to another (which I call 
“conceptual transfer”). The study shows how these conceptual processes sequen-
tially unfolded in the ESSR in 1987–1988, culminating in the concept of 
“sovereignty” rising to prominence in late 1987. 
The dissertation shows that the conceptual innovation of isemajandamine in 
1987–1988 relied on several institutional, ideological, intellectual, and linguistic 
resources. It highlights the role of the scientific community of the ESSR in this 
process. This community used scientific concepts and methods (first to unlock 
and then gain control of the political language) that were very much part of the 
global scientific discourse. The dissertation demonstrates that global scientific 
thought and its local reception in the ESSR played a crucial role in legitimizing 
the “self-management” project. One of the specificities of the Estonian case was 
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that it served as a laboratory for economic experiments in the centrally launched 
initiative to reform the economic policies of the Soviet Union in the 1980s. 
A series of economic experiments in the Estonian SSR in the 1980s created new 
employment forms (like “contractual units”), which led to a higher degree of 
economic independence for minor units in enterprises. This economic model 
enabled the IM group to advocate a similar model for a territorial unit in the 
Soviet Union. The discourse of scientific objectivity and a particular way of argu-
mentation in the public sphere enabled social scientists to further develop reform 
ideas by creatively adopting scientific concepts (borrowed from economics, future 
studies, system approach, etc.). The global science discourse served as an intel-
lectual resource for making “conceptual transfers” from scientific disciplines to 
politics to legitimize the “territorial self-management” claim. The table below 
schematically summarizes the resources for the conceptual innovation of IM: 
 
Table 2. The contextual resources for the conceptual innovation of IM 
Historical 
contexts  
Available contextual resources for the conceptual innovation of IM 
Institutional 
(I, II) 
New Economic Policy (NEP) in 1921–1928 
National Economy Council in 1957–1965 
Economic “experiments” in the 1970s and 1980s 




Scientific objectivity discourse  
“New thinking” 
“Critique,” “improvement,” “plan,” “experiment”  
The official campaign of “bottom-up” initiatives in economy  
Intellectual 
(III) 
Soviet regional economic thought  
Estonian managerial school  
System-theory thought 
Global studies and future scenarios 
Linguistic  
(II, III) 
The prefix “self-” (ise-) in isemajandamine was missing in Russian 
khozraschet and translations into native languages of other Soviet 
republics, including Latvian and Lithuanian 
 
The dissertation’s second thesis is that it is possible to create an alternative 
political language through expert languages in a late totalitarian regime. To 
confirm this thesis, the dissertation identifies three argumentative “languages” that 
Estonian authors used to describe and reform politics: (1) decentralist, (2) system 
theory, and (3) open innovation (see Table 1). The availability of these languages 
made possible “conceptual transfers” from one disciplinary domain to another. 





Table 3. Conceptual transfers from one domain to another in 1986–1988 in the ESSR 
Conceptual transfers from one domain to another 
in 1986–1988 in the ESSR 
Domain Concept/term New domain 
Economic administration Self-accounting 
(khozraschet; 
isemajandamine) 
Politics / foreign politics / 
economic politics / 
management 
System theory / 
Management theory  
Self-regulation Social policy / economy / 
administrative policy 
Philosophy of science / 
Physical chemistry 
Self-organization Politics 
Futurology / Global 
studies  
Future scenario Economy / Politics 
Cybernetics / System 
theory 
Feedback Politics 
Economy Horizontal relations Foreign politics / 
federal politics 
 
Finally, the dissertation’s approach advances existing scholarship, suggesting that 
it can serve as a foundation for a broader conceptual innovation theory in the 
milieus where authors in the public sphere have faced the “locked text problem.” 
It creates a theoretical framework for studying the role of expert languages within 
this situation, which can also be applied (or at least tested) to explore similar cases 




















SUMMARY IN ESTONIAN 
Majandusiseseisvusest poliitilise suveräänsuseni: 
leiutades „isemajandamist“ Eesti NSV-s 
Doktoritöö pakub välja uudse metoodika uurimaks revolutsioonilisi protsesse, 
näidates mõisteliste muutuste olulisust eelrevolutsioonilisel perioodil. Töö kesk-
mes on mõistelised muutused, mis leidsid aset Eesti NSV avalikus arutelus ja 
poliitikas 1985. aastal Nõukogude Liidus alanud „perestroika“ kampaania kesk-
paigas (1987–1988). Töö asetab Eestis toimunud mõistelised protsessid maailma-
ajaloolisse perspektiivi ning näitab, mil moel olid Eesti sündmused olulised Ida-
Euroopa 1989. a revolutsioonide kontekstis ning avaldasid märkimisväärset mõju 
Nõukogude Liidu kokkuvarisemisele (1991). 
Doktoritööl on kaks peamist fookust. Esimeseks on muutused Eesti NSV 
poliitilises keeles ja mõistetes. Briti sovietoloog Archie Brown on nimetanud 
perestroika keskpaika „mõistete revolutsiooniks“ (conceptual revolution), pidades 
silmas NSVL keskvõimu poolt kasutusele võetud uute mõistete (nagu „õigus-
riik“, „pluralism“ jm) mõju reformide radikaliseerumisele. Samas ei ole uurimist 
leidnud Eesti NSV-s toimunud samalaadne protsess, milles kerkisid esile eel-
kõige mõisted „isemajandamine“, „iseregulatsioon“ ja „suveräänsus“. Töö näitab, 
kuidas mõiste „isemajandamine“ pidev laienemine 1987. aasta lõpul ja 1988. a 
alguses (samuti kõigi kolme nimetatud mõiste kooseksisteerimine IME liiku-
mises aastal 1988) avaldas olulist mõju võitlusele keskvõimuga. Doktoritöö ees-
märgiks on seega uuesti mõtestada Eesti taasiseseisvumise konteksti, asetades 
fookuse esiteks varasemasse perioodi ning teiseks revolutsiooni keelelisele 
aspektile. See on oluline ka laiemas mastaabis, kuna Eesti NSV-st 1987. a alguse 
saanud mõistete revolutsioon laienes 1988 suvel teistesse liiduvabariikidesse 
ning kulmineerus vabariikide nn. „suveräänsuste paraadiga“ aastatel 1989–1991.  
Doktoritöö teine fookus on Eesti NSV teadlaskonna rollil neis muutustes. 
Intellektuaalide ja teadlaste roll 1987.–88. a sündmustes on küll üldiselt tunnus-
tatud (loomeliitude pleenum, Rahvarinde loomine jne), ent samas ei ole vaadel-
dud teadlaste poolset poliitilise keele „hõivamist“ läbi pikema perioodi rekonst-
ruktsiooni. Kui seni on Eesti ajalookirjutus peamiselt käsitlenud poliitilist aja-
lugu, siis käesolev töö võtab vaatluse alla perestroika perioodi intellektuaalse 
ajaloo, küsides, millised mõisted ja „keeled“, millistest teadusvaldkondadest olid 
teadlastele vahenditeks poliitiliste muutuste ellu kutsumisel ja laiendamisel. 
Doktoritöö kasutab selleks Cambridge’i koolkonna intellektuaalajaloo meetodit, 
lähtudes John Pococki ja Quentin Skinneri teoreetilistest lähtealustest. Töö näitab, 
kuidas intellektuaalsed arengud teadlaskonna ja reformipoliitilise keele vahel 
Eesti NSV-s ei seisnud lahus maailmas toimunud samalaadsest protsessist 1960.–
1980. aastatel. Siinsed arengud olid seotud ülemaailmses teaduskogukonnas esile 
kerkinud uute distsipliinidega nagu süsteemiteooria, juhtimisteadus, globaal-
uuringud ja stsenaariumimeetod. Samuti ei seisnud need lahus sotsiaalsetest aren-
gutest maailmas, nagu näiteks valitsusi nõustavate ekspertide (sh. ekspertkeele) 
rolli tõus poliitikas mõlemal pool Külma sõja rindejoont. Mainitud valdkondade 
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argumendid ja mõistestik said intellektuaalseks raamistikuks Eesti NSV sotsiaal- 
ja loodusteadlastele, mida oli võimalik kasutada poliitikasse sisenemisel perest-
roika tulekul 1985. aastal.  
Töö üks teadlikke piiranguid on see, et keskendutakse alternatiivsele reformi-
poliitilisele diskursusele ENSV-s ja teaduskogukonnale kui selle kandjale. Vaat-
luse all ei ole õigusliku järjepidevuse doktriini raamistamine Kodanike komiteede 
poolt (1989), ega näiteks dissidentide või 1988. a suvel asutatud ERSP retoorika 
analüüs.186 Töö kronoloogiliseks lõpp-punktiks on ENSV Ülemnõukogu poolne 
suveräänsusdeklaratsiooni vastuvõtmine 16.11.1988. 
Doktoritöö esitab sissejuhatuses lühiülevaate revolutsioonide uurimise aja-
loost, paigutades „mõistete revolutsiooni“ sellega laiemasse raamistikku. Esi-
tatakse lühiülevaade neljast lähenemisest, mis võtavad aluseks erinevad fookused: 
(1) sotsiaalmajanduslikud struktuurid (2) idee-kesksus (3) rahvusülesed võrgus-
tikud ning (4) mõisted ja keeleline aspekt. Kirjeldades mainitud lähenemiste 
võimalusi ja puuduseid, pakub töö seejärel välja uue kategooria millega ana-
lüüsida mõistete olulisust revolutsioonides. Selleks on „mõisteline innovatsioon“ 
(conceptual innovation), mida töös rakendatakse 1987. a ENSV-s toimunud 
„isemajandamise“ ettepaneku ja sellele järgnenud liikumise näitel ning analüüsib 
seda protsessi võimaldanud tingimusi.  
 
Doktoritöö esimene väide on, et Eesti NSV-s toimus aastatel 1987–1988 spet-
siifiline mõistelise muutuse protsess, millel oli oluline roll vabariigi poliitika 
radikaliseerumisele. Selle muutuse spetsiifika seisneb esiteks „väikeste“ ja tehni-
liste ekspertmõistete muutmisel poliitilise debati keskpunktiks hilistotalitaarses 
poolsuletud süsteemis (vastukaaluks suurtele võtmemõistetele nagu nt „ise-
seisvus“ või „vabadus“). Teiseks, selle protsessi käivitajaks saab olla mõisteline 
innovatsioon. „Mõistelise innovatsiooni“ all pean ma silmas tegevust, mis lisaks 
termini varasema tähenduse muutmisele tekitab ka intellektuaalse platvormi 
mõiste edasiseks laienduseks ning uute mõistete esiletõusuks. Alates 1941. aastast 
ENSV plaanimajanduses kasutatud raamatupidamistermini (ettevõtte „isemajan-
damine“) tähenduse innoveerimisest 1987. aastal sai kogu vabariigi teadlaskonda 
mobiliseeriv platvorm, mille kaudu laiendati termini mõistet nii ruumiliselt 
(majandusüksuselt territoriaalüksusele) kui valdkonniti („ettevõtte isemajanda-
misest“ kõikide sfääride isemajandamiseni vabariigis). Kui publikatsioon I 
kirjeldab 1985. a toimunud majanduseksperimendi käigus toimunud teenindus-
ettevõtete „sisese isemajandamise“ laiendamist (millega suurenes üksuste majan-
duslik iseseisvus) kui majandusmudelit enne innovatsiooni, siis publikatsioonid I 
ja II näitavad mudeliga toimunud „mõistelist innovatsiooni“ aastatel 1987–1988 
ning toovad välja selle eeldused ja tagajärjed. „Isemajandamise“ innovatsioon 
                                                                          
186  Selle põhjuseks on nii see, et õigusliku järjepidevuse doktriini on teaduskirjanduses enam 
uuritud, vt nt Pettai (2004) aga ka see, et käesoleva töö fookus on eelkõige perestroika kesk-
paiga (1986–1988) avalikkusel, mil avalikku poliitilist diskursust mõjutas töös analüüsitav 
„suletud teksti“ fenomen, samas kui Kodanike komiteede liikumine ja õigusliku järjepidevuse 
esiletõus avalikkuses algab 1989. aasta algul. 
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ENSV-s aastatel 1987–1988 toetus nimelt mitmetele ressurssidele. Nendeks olid 
institutsionaalsed (nt. varasemad „majanduseksperimendid“ kui legaalsed tegevus-
mudelid); ideoloogilised („suletud tekst“ ja „teaduslik objektiivsus“ kui perest-
roika-aegne argumenteerimisvorm); intellektuaalsed (globaalse teadusmõtte 
rakendamine ENSV-s); ning keelelised ressursid (sh. termini „isemajandamine“ 
eripärane tõlge venekeelsest terminist „khozraschet“).187  
Doktoritöö kirjeldab perioodi 1985–1988 kui jätkuvat hilistotalitaarset süs-
teemi. Tegu oli jätkuvalt ühe monoliitse partei, tsenseeritava „suletud teksti“ ning 
julgeolekuteenistuse poolt kontrollitava režiimiga, mis muudab perestroika kui 
reformikampaania alguse eriliseks vararevolutsiooniliseks situatsiooniks. Tsen-
suur muutus perestroika kampaania osaks ning tekitas spetsiifilise argumentat-
sioonivormi autoritele. Reformiettepanekud avalikus ruumis pidid arvestama uue 
ideoloogilise kaanoniga ning lähtuma perestroika sõnavarast, seega peasekretäri 
ja tema nõunike kõnedest ning teadusliku objektiivsuse diskursusest. Töö kirjel-
dab muuhulgas kuidas sotsiaal- ja majandusteadlaste poolne ideoloogilise keele 
„hõivamine“ toimus ka peasekretäri meeskonnas ning millist mõju see avaldas 
ENSV arengutele, luues omalaadse teaduslik-ideoloogilise „kreoolkeele“ siin-
setele autoritele ja riiklikele ideoloogiaosakondadele. 
 
Doktoritöö teine väide on, et hilistotalitaarses süsteemis on alternatiivne poliiti-
line keel võimalik luua erialasõnavaradest. Selle teesi kinnituseks toon ma välja, 
et varase perestroika perioodil tärganud avalik-poliitiline keel koosnes erine-
vatest raamistikest, mis olid pärit eriteadustest ning mida püüti rakendada, et 
kirjeldada ja reformida poliitikasfääri. Selle protsessi käigus toimus erialaste 
mõistete „siirdamine“ teadusavalikkusest poliitilisse avalikkusesse (conceptual 
transfer). Argumentatiivseid keeli, mis seesugust siirdamist võimaldasid, eris-
tatakse doktoritöös kolm: (1) detsentralism; (2) süsteemiteooria; ning (3) avatud 
innovatsioon (vt sellekohast tabelit nr 1). Ma väidan, et lisaks traditsiooniliste 
„keelte“ uurimisele poliitilise mõtte ajaloos (vabariiklus, juriidilisus, jne), peak-
sime seda kontseptsiooni laiendama ka teadus- ja nn. „ekspertkeeltele“, mis osu-
tusid ENSV puhul olulisteks kanaliteks mille kaudu poliitikat kirjeldati ja ellu 
viidi. Töö täpsemaks juhtumiks nende keelte eristamisel on „vabariikliku ise-
majandamise“ debatt, selle projekti mõtestamine ja legitimeerimine erinevate 
autorite poolt.  
Nagu eespool mainitud, on töö eesmärk näidata, et Eesti perestroika keeled ei 
olnud isoleeritud muust maailmast. Vastupidi, nad oli tihedalt seotud Euroopa 
teadusteoreetilise-, majandus- ning intellektuaalse mõttega. Töö argument on, et 
peame nende esile kerkimist Eesti NSV-s mõistma ühelt poolt läbi eelneva aja-
loolis-institutsionaalse arengu, aga teiselt poolt ka läbi diskursiivsete võimaluste, 
mida pakkus Nõukogude ametlik (leninistlik-marksistlik) diskursus; varasem 
detsentralistlik Nõukogude diskursus (nt NEP ning Rahvamajandusnõukogude 
reform) ja 1985. a alanud perestroika kampaania; teiste sotsialismimaade reformid; 
ning alates 1960-ndatest üha globaliseeruv teadusavalikkus, sh. NSV Liidus. 
                                                                          
187  Vt kontekstuaalsete ressursside tabelit ingliskeelses kokkuvõttes (tabel nr 2). 
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Laiemas plaanis näitlikustab doktoritöö, milline oli teadlaste ja ekspertide roll 
ning osakaal Ida-Euroopa riikide 1980-ndate lõpu revolutsioonilistes sündmustes. 
Doktoritöö aitab mõista Eesti lähiajaloos toimunud muutuste maailma-
ajaloolist konteksti, võimaldades lugejal seostada Eesti NSV-s toimunud muutusi 
ülejäänud protsessidega maailmas. Nt vastupidiselt laialt levinud narratiivile, et 
innovatsioon ja tulevikku suunatud mõtlemine sai Eestis alguse pigem 1990-ndatel 
ehk turumajanduse tingimustes, näitab doktoritöö kuidas „avatud innovatsiooni“ 
keel eksisteeris Eesti NSV-s palju pikemat aega, võttes alguspunktiks 1960ndad 
aastad. Tollane küberneetika ja süsteemiteoreetilise mõtte tõus maailmas, majandus-
eksperimentide jada ENSV-s (sh eksperimendid teeninduse ja kergetööstuse 
valdkonnas 1980.ndate keskel), TRÜ sotsioloogide ja TPI juhtimiskoolkonna 
teooria ja praktika, tulevikustsenaariumide konkurss 1987 mais, IME projekt kui 
(tänapäeva sõnavaras start-up) platvorm alternatiivsetele ideedele ENSV tule-
vikust – kõik need arengud on osalised selles, et saaksime vaadelda innovatsiooni 
Eestis (nii oma institutsionaalse arengu kui intellektuaalse mõtte osas) märksa 
pikemas ajalises perspektiivis.  
Viimaks, doktoritöö näitab, kuidas mõiste „suveräänsuse“ esilekerkimine sel 
perioodil toimus mitte läbi konstitutsioonilise ressursi kasutuse, vaid seoses läbi 
„isemajandamise“ mõistelise innovatsiooni, mis tekitas debati (kui platvormi) uute 
mõistete esiletõusuks. Liiduvabariigi „suveräänsus“ pidi juriidiliselt tagama vaba-
riikliku „majandusiseseisvuse“ projekti. Alles 1988. a septembris muutus „suve-
räänsus“ võtmemõisteks IME liikumises, kuna selgus, et sel on suurem potentsiaal 
tuua kaasa reaalseid muutuseid föderaalses seadusandluses. Seega, töö näitab see-






Saharov, Juhan (2018). “An Economic Innovation as an Icebreaker: The 
Contractual Work Experiment in Soviet Estonia in 1985,” in The Baltic 
States and the End of the Cold War, eds. Kaarel Piirimäe and Olaf Mertels-
mann (Peter Lang). 
 
Doktoritöö esimene artikkel kirjeldab ja analüüsib Eesti NSV-s 1985. a toimunud 
„lepingulise töö eksperimenti“ teenindusvaldkonnas. Eksperimendi põhisisuks 
oli uut tüüpi „lepingulise töövormi nr. 2“ kasutuselevõtt Eesti NSV teenindus-
ettevõtetes, mille kohaselt teenindusettevõtete töötajatel oli õigus rentida ette-
võtte ruume ja inventari, moodustades teenindusettevõtte sisese „isemajandava 
lepinguüksuse“. „Lepinguüksus“ oli ühelt poolt kohustatud täitma ettevõtte plaani-
näitajaid, ent teiselt poolt (olulise muudatusena senises ENSV teeninduses) jäi 
üksuse poolt tehtud üleplaanilisest tööst saadud tulu lepinguüksuse enda käsu-
tusse. Artikkel kirjeldab ka eksperimendile eelnenud ettevalmistusperioodi (1979–
1984), mille peamiseks figuuriks oli Eesti NSV Teenindusministeeriumi Instituudi 
juhataja ja Gosplani (NSVL Plaanikomitee) töötaja Juhan Sillaste ning Gosplani 
juures 1982. aastal moodustatud spetsiaalne töögrupp uurimaks Vastastikuse 
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Majandusabi Nõukogu riikide majanduskogemusi. Töögrupi eesmärgiks oli ana-
lüüsida teiste sotsialismimaade praktikaid ja nende kasutusvõimalusi Nõukogude 
Liidu majandussfääris. Sillaste kui töögrupi üks liikmetest keskendus Ungari 
Rahvavabariigile ja selle teenindusvaldkonnale, kuhu toimus ka õppevisiit. Naas-
nuna Ungarist koostas Sillaste raporti NSVL Ministrite Nõukogule „lepingulise 
töövormi“ kasutusvõimaluse osas Eesti NSV-s ning 1984. aastal luba eksperi-
mendiks ka anti. Lepinguüksusi oli võimalik hakata looma 01.01.1985 (millega 
eksperiment ametlikult algas). Eelpoolmainitud „lepinguline töövorm nr. 2“ viidi 
kogu Nõukogude Liidus läbi vaid Eesti NSV-s.  
Eksperimendi autori Juhan Sillaste üheks eesmärgiks oli tekitada ettevõtte-
sisene partnerlus, millega paraneks teenindustööde kvaliteet ja defitsiidi vähene-
mine tavatarbijatele. Partnerluse tekitamise eesmärgiks oli reform teenindus-
valdkonnas, leevendamaks „vertikaalse“, ülalt-alla suunatud plaanimajanduse 
meetodi mõju teenindusele. Selle kaasnähtuseks oli laiem muutus teeninduses 
1985–1987, millega töötajatest said teenindusettevõtte juhtkonnale partnerid, teisi-
sõnu, töötaja muutus objektist subjektiks. Artikli üheks järelduseks on, et „ise-
majanduslike üksuste lepingulise töö“ sisseviimine teeninduses on näide „horison-
taalsest lepingulisusest“ kui ühest kontseptuaalsest raamistikust varase perestroika 
perioodi reformimõttes (mis toob kaasa aktiivse subjektsuse lepinguüksustes).  
Peale teenindusvaldkonna institutsionaliseerus see ka teistes valdkondades, nt 
Eesti NSV põllumajanduses 1986. aastal (läbi „töövõtulepingute“ eksperimendi 
Eesti NSV Agrotööstuskompleksis). Edasist uurimistööd vajav hüpotees, mis 
antud artiklist koorub on, kas isemajandavatele suhetele baseeruvat „horisontaalset 
lepingulisust“ (kui uut majandusmudelit 1985–1986 teeninduses ja põllumajan-
duses) saab pidada varaseks näiteks detsentralistlikust keelest, mida poliitilisel 
tasandil kasutati ENSV „horisontaalsete suhete“ loomiseks keskvõimu ja teiste 
liiduvabariikidega ning milline oli nende kahe (nö. majandusliku ja poliitilise 






Saharov, Juhan (2021). “From an Economic Term to a Political Concept: 
The Conceptual Innovation of ‘Self-Management’ in Soviet Estonia,” Con-
tributions to the History of Concepts, Vol. 16, Issue 1. 
 
Doktoritöö teine artikkel vaatleb „isemajandamise“ mõiste ajalugu Eesti NSV-s, 
võttes fookusesse selle innovatsiooni aastatel 1987–1988. „Isemajandamine“ oli 
kauaaegne Nõukogude plaanimajanduse termin (vene k khozraschet), mis tähistas 
kas „ettevõttesisest“ või siis ettevõtte „täielikku“ töötamist isetasuvuse (vene k 
samookupaemost) printsiibil – ettevõte sai tekitada kulusid vaid oma tulude baasil. 
I artiklis kirjeldatud töövorm (isemajandav lepinguüksus) on ettevõttesisese ise-
majandamise näiteks. Mõiste radikaalne innovatsioon toimus 1987. a septembris, 
mil nn. „Nelja mehe ettepanek“ pakkus välja idee viia kogu Eesti NSV „täielikule 
isemajandamisele“ ning algatas vabariigi „majandusliku iseseisvuse“ kui 
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majanduspoliitilise projekti läbitöötamise Eesti teadusavalikkuses. „Nelja mehe 
ettepanek“ kasutas nõukogude plaanimajanduses majandusüksuse töövormi 
terminit pretsedenditul kujul, liites selle esialgsele tähendusele „territoriaalsuse“ 
liiduvabariigi tasandil.  
Artikkel toob välja kolm erinevat „dimensiooni“ selle mõiste innovatsioonis, 
näidates selleks toiminguks vajalikku kontekstuaalset ressurssi (kui struktuuri) ja 
tegevust (kui agentsust): (1) lingvistiline (2) poliitiline (3) transnatsionaalne. Sel-
leks rakendatakse artiklis Quentin Skinneri teoreetilist lähenemist intellektuaal-
ajaloo distsipliinist, mille järgi me peaksime vaatlema igasugust ideoloogilist 
uuendust alati dialoogis olemasoleva sõnavara ja ideedega, et mõista mida autorid 
ja tekstid „teevad“ võrreldes teiste tekstidega antud kontekstis. „Territoriaalse 
isemajandamise“ kui mõistelise innovatsiooni lingvistiline dimensioon seisnes 
termini eesliite ise- ärakasutamises ettepaneku koostajate poolt. Poliitiline dimen-
sioon seisnes selle muutuse „ettekavatsemata tagajärgedes“ poliitilisele prot-
sessile 1988. aastal, sh järk-järguline laienemine kitsast majandusmõistest kogu 
ühiskonna altpoolt (nn. iseregulatiivsetel alustel) juhtimist kirjeldavaks mõisteks, 
mis kulmineerus suveräänsusdeklaratsiooniga 1988. a novembris. Transnatsio-
naalne dimensioon seisnes selle mõiste toimimises kõikides liiduvabariikides 
kuna majandusliku iseseisvuse idee transformeerus kõikides liiduvabariikides 
Eesti NSV eeskujul suveräänsuse nõudeks aastatel 1989–90. Nii „majanduslikku 
iseseisvust“ kui „suveräänsust“ kasutati liiduvabariikide eliitide poolt edukalt 
võitluses keskvõimuga oma majanduslike õiguste laiendamiseks, teisisõnu, sel 
oli transnatsionaalne potentsiaal, kuna kõik liiduvabariigid vajasid ühist plat-
vormi (ja seda plaanimajanduse mõiste võimaldas), mida kasutada läbirääkimistel 
Moskvaga. Selle konkreetseks näiteks tuuakse artiklis ära Balti liiduvabariikide 
ühine platvorm (mille algatasid Rahvarinne ja Sajudis 1988 suvel), mis kulmi-
neerus 1989. a novembris Nõukogude Liidu Ülemnõukogu otsusega „Balti liidu-
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Doktoritöö kolmas artikkel vaatleb „territoriaalse isemajandamise“ nõude kujune-
mise seotust esiteks globaaluuringutest pärit „tulevikustsenaariumi“ mõistega 
ning teiseks vaatleb selle legitimeerimist Eesti avalikus ruumis läbi teadusmõtte, 
peamiselt läbi süsteemiteooria. Artikli väiteks on, et aastatel 1987–1988 siirdati 
teadusvaldkonnast poliitilisele väljale kaks mõistet – „tulevikustsenaarium“ ja 
„iseregulatsioon“, mille eesmärk oli legitimeerida Eesti NSV territoriaalmajan-
duslike õiguste laiendamise nõue. Artikkel toob välja kolm autorit, kes süsteemi-
teooriat või tuleviku-uuringuid otseselt kasutasid oma argumentide tutvustamisel: 
Edgar Savisaar, Uno Mereste ja Meelik Kattago. Artikkel kasutab teoreetilise 
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raamistikuna Quentin Skinneri meetodit intellektuaalajaloos, mis vaatleb autori-
poolset mõistekasutust kui poliitilise tegutseja kõnetegu oma kaasaja situatsioonis. 
Artikkel näitab, et me saame anda spetsiifilise tähenduse mainitud autorite tege-
vusele, milleks oli innovaatilis-kontseptuaalne tegu või samm (conceptual move) 
olemasoleva keele sees, mille eesmärgiks oli siirdada teatud mõisted teadusvald-
konnast poliitikavaldkonda vabariigi reformimõtte kaitseks. Sellel olid mitmed 
kontekstuaalsed ressursid: (1) ideoloogiline ehk perestroika algusaegne argu-
mentatsiooniloogika (reformi kasuks sai argumenteerida ainult läbi eriteaduste); 
(2) intellektuaalne ressurss, milleks olid 1960.–70ndatel ülemaailmses teadus-
kogukonnas esile kerkinud distsipliinid – süsteemiteooria, juhtimisteadus, globaal- 
ja tuleviku-uuringud ning nende retseptsioon Eestis. Perestroika algusaegne argu-
mentatsiooniloogika (1985–1987) seisnes hierarhilise kõnediskursuse kasuta-
misel. Näiteks pidid Eesti reformimeelsed autorid siduma oma mõtteid ja väiteid 
NLKP peasekretäri poolse mõistestikuga või Nõukogude akadeemikute töödega. 
Ent Eesti autoritel oli võimalus neid ka ümber mõtestada või laenata mõisteid 
maailmateadusest.  
Üheks seesuguseks näiteks toob artikkel Edgar Savisaare varased kirjutised 
globaal- ja tuleviku-uuringutest ning tema poolt kasutatud „tulevikustsenaariumi“ 
mõiste siirdamise Eesti NSV Plaanikomitee halduspoliitika keelde. Nimelt 1987. a 
kevadel korraldas Savisaare osakond Plaanikomitees ülevabariigilise rahvamajan-
duse arengustsenaariumite konkursi, mille eesmärgiks oli (konkursi juhendi järgi) 
„saada originaalseid, teaduslikult põhjendatud, alternatiivseid tulevikustsenaariu-
meid“, mille väljundiks oli muuhulgas „kujundada loomingulisi teaduslikke 
uurimisgruppe interdistsiplinaarsete uuringute arendamiseks vabariigis“. Konkursi 
üheks tagajärjeks oli alternatiivsete stsenaariumitega jätkamine Plaanikomitees, 
mis seisnes „territoriaalse isemajandamise“ ettepaneku väljatöötamisega ekspert-
grupi poolt Plaanikomitees augustis 1987 ning selle avaliku esitamisega „Edasis“ 
29.09.1987.  
Teiseks innovaatilis-kontseptuaalseks kõneteoks Skinneri raamistikus oli „ise-
regulatsiooni“ toomine süsteemiteooriast poliitilisele väljale 1987.–1988. aastal, 
mida saab pidada „mõisteliseks siirdeks“. Artikkel annab ülevaate selle mõiste 
ilmumisest 1987.a lõpus avalikku ruumi (kohe pärast „isemajandamise“ ette-
panekut), mis jõuab lõpuks nii IME ametlikku koondkontseptsiooni (esitati valit-
susele 01.nov 1988) kui seadusandlusesse, milleks oli „Seadus Eesti NSV ise-
majandamise alustest“ (vastu võetud 18.mai 1989). Lisaks IME liikumise doku-
mentidele, vaatleb artikkel „iseregulatsiooni“ esinemist koos „isemajandamisega“ 
teiste autorite 1988.a esseistikas, nt majandusteadlase Uno Mereste „isemajanda-
misteoorias“ ning filosoof Meelik Kattago „tasatuse teoorias“. Mõlemad teadlased 
põhjendavad „isemajandamise“ reformi läbi omaenda erialakeele ja mõistestiku. 
Viimaks, artikkel toob välja kuidas ülaltoodud mõistestiku kasutamine andis 
omapoolse panuse „suveräänsuse“ mõiste esile kerkimisele 1988. a jooksul. Nõue 
„majandusliku iseseisvuse“ osas muutus küsimuseks vabariigi suveräänsusest. 
Eestist alguse saanud „mõisteline revolutsioon“ laienes teistesse liiduvabariiki-
desse ning tõi kaasa suveräänsusdeklaratsioonide paraadi (1989–1991), millel oli 
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